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Forew ord
The AICPA Tax Division represents the views of the 230,000 members of 
the AICPA on tax matters. Many AICPA members work regularly with the 
tax law, applying it to business and individual taxpayers at all levels of in­
come. We have a unique perspective of the tax law and believe that we are 
obligated, in the public interest, to analyze and express our views on major 
tax proposals. We have analyzed The President’s Tax Proposals to the Con­
gress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity, and our comments are presented 
herein.
The AICPA comments were developed by the various subcommittees of 
the AICPA tax division and approved by the tax division executive commit­
tee. Listed below are the Executive Committee members and subcommit­
tee chairmen who approved these comments. The work of the many other 
tax division members who made substantial contributions to this project is 
greatly appreciated.
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND  
SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMEN
Albert B. Ellentuck, Chairman 
David F. Bertrand 
Mario P. Borini 
Saul Braverman 
Stanley H. Brietbard 
Edward A. Bush 
R. Duane Carter 
Joseph E. DeCaminada 
John F. Edgar, Jr.
Arthur M. Friedman 
Francis M. Gaffney 
Michael A. Henning
AICPA STAFF
Kenneth F. Thomas, Director 
William R. Stromsem, 
Assistant Director
Robert R. Hill 
C. Paul Jannis 
Jerry D. Kimbrough 
Daniel F. Kruger 
Herbert J. Lerner 
Bernard W. Nebenzahl 
Gerald W. Padwe 
Charles W. Phillippi 
Robert M. Rosen 
Weldon J. Squyres 
Stephen M. Walker
James S. Clark, Manager 
Carol B. Ferguson, Manager 
Edward S. Karl, Manager
C o n t e n t s
Summary of General Recommendations and Conclusions 1
Summary of Specific Comments 2
General Recommendations and Conclusions 8
Moratorium 8
National Commission on Tax Simplification 9
Immediate Necessary Reform 10
Effect on Stability of Tax System 10
Effect on Tax Accounting 11
Effect on the Interrelationships of Government 13
Effect on Simplification 16
Specific Comments 17
Reduce Marginal Tax Rates 17
Increase Fairness for Families 18
Make the System More Neutral and Fair 19
Reduce Recordkeeping and Complexity 24
Conclusion 26
Simplify the System of Filing 27
Revise the Taxation of Corporate Income 29
Revise Taxation of Business Property and Capital Assets 31
Measure Income Properly 35
Revise Taxation of Energy and Natural Resources 41
Reform Taxation of Financial Institutions 45
Modify Other Specific Subsidies 46
Curtail Tax Shelters 46
Revise Treatment of Retirement Savings 47
Reform International Taxation 53
SUMMARY OF GENERAL 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
CONCLUSIONS
These comments reflect the general views of the AICPA Tax Division on 
the Administration’s May 1985 tax reform plan, as well as the Division’s 
reaction to selected specific proposals in the plan. Our general views, de­
veloped more thoroughly in the following pages, may be summarized as 
follows:
1. We support the concept of lowering rates and base broadening consis­
tent with sound economic and fiscal policy. We feel this should only 
be done after a careful and thorough analysis of the related economic 
and tax policy issues.
2. A moratorium on further tax legislation is needed until such time as 
the macroeconomic effects of the Administration’s proposals are bet­
ter understood. During the period of such a moratorium, an ap­
pointed nonpartisan commission should seek to arrive at a prudent, 
overall plan for tax reform and a series of proposals for tax changes 
that will lead to fairness, simplicity, and economic growth.
3. We question whether the goal of an economically, politically, and so­
cially neutral tax system is realistic. Historically, many tax changes 
have been undertaken to encourage or discourage certain economic, 
political, and social behavior. Presumably, this will occur again in the 
future and “tax neutrality” will then need to be set aside.
4. The proposals often selectively ignore policies that have historically
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formed the basis for tax accounting concepts. In addition, the tax 
accounting concepts found in this plan are inconsistently applied and 
lack sound reasoning. This results in the absence of a clear definition 
of what the tax accounting concepts should be and how they can be 
applied consistently.
5. The proposals do not adequately address the impact on the interre­
lationships between federal, state, and local governments. The overall 
effect on such relationships is likely to be adverse, and more consid­
eration of the implications is needed.
6. If it is determined that major tax reform is needed at this time, we 
urge the careful selection of only those changes that will actually 
achieve the desired goals. Transition rules that will lend a substantial 
degree of stability to the tax law should also be included.
7. Many of the proposals within the Administration’s plan offer signifi­
cant improvements and strive toward simplification, while others in­
troduce still further complexity and create more problems. For this 
reason, the AICPA neither supports nor opposes the entire plan. 
Rather, we have examined each item individually and either sup­
ported it, opposed it, or recommended modification to it. Our specific 
comments elaborate on these conclusions.
SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC COMMENTS
Support
Proposal
Oppose
Proposal
Recommend
Modification
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES
CHAPTER 1. REDUCE
MARGINAL TAX 
RATES
1.01 Reduce Marginal Tax
Rates ........................................ X
CHAPTER 2. INCREASE
FAIRNESS FOR 
FAMILIES
2.01 Increase ZBA and 
Personal Exem ptions..............
2.02 Combine Tax Benefits 
for Elderly, Blind, and 
Disabled into Expanded 
Credit ......................................
X
X
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2.03 Repeal Two-Earner
D eduction ....................
2.05 Replace Child and
Dependent Care Credit 
with Deduction ..........
CHAPTER 3. MAKE THE
SYSTEM MORE 
NEUTRAL AND  
FAIR
Part A. Excluded Sources of 
Income—Fringe 
Benefits
3.02 Repeal $5,000 Exclusion 
for Employer-provided 
Death B enefits ..............
Part B. Excluded Sources of 
Income—Wage 
Replacement Payments
3.06 Repeal Exclusion for 
Unemployment and 
Disability Payments . . . .
Part C. Excluded Sources of 
Income—Other
3.07 Limit Scholarship and 
Fellowship Exclusion . . .
3.08 Repeal Exclusion for 
Prizes and A w ards........
Part D. Preferred Uses of 
Income
3.09 Repeal Deduction of 
State and Local Taxes ..
Part E. Tax Abuses—Mixed 
Business/Personal Use
3.11 Limit Deduction for 
Entertainment and 
Business Meal Expenses
Part F. Tax Abuses—Income 
Shifting
3.13 Adjust Tax Rate on 
Unearned Income of 
Minor Children ............
Support Oppose Recommend
Proposal Proposal Modification
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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Support Oppose Recommend
Proposal Proposal Modification
3.14 Revise Grantor and 
Non-Grantor Trust 
Taxation.................................... X
3.15 Revise Income Taxation 
of Estates ................................ X
CHAPTER 4. REDUCE
RECORD­
KEEPING AND 
COMPLEXITY
4.01 Impose Floor on 
Employee Business 
Expense and Other 
Miscellaneous
Deductions .............................. X
4.04 Repeal Adoption 
Expense D eduction ................ X
4.05 Repeal Income
Averaging ................................ X
4.06 Simplify Penalty 
Provisions ................................ X
CHAPTER 5. SIMPLIFY THE
SYSTEM OF 
FILING
5.01 Implement Return-Free 
S ystem ...................................... X
BUSINESS AND CAPITAL 
INCOME TAXES
CHAPTER 6. REVISE THE
TAXATION OF
CORPORATE
INCOME
6.02 Reduce Double Taxation 
of Corporate Earnings 
Distributed to
Shareholders............................ X
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Support Oppose Recommend
Proposal Proposal Modification
6.03 Repeal $100/$200 
Dividend Income 
Exclusion.................................. X
CHAPTER 7. REVISE
TAXATION OF 
BUSINESS 
PROPERTY AND  
CAPITAL ASSETS
7.01 Adopt New Capital Cost
Recovery System
(CCRS) .................................... X
7.02 Repeal Investment Tax 
Credit ...................................... X
7.03 Revise Tax Treatment of 
Capital Gains .......................... X
7.04 Index Inventories.................... X
7.05 Retain $5,000 Limit on 
Expensing Depreciable 
Business Property .................. X
7.07 Deny Rate Reduction 
Benefit Attributable to 
Excess Depreciation .............. X
CHAPTER 8. MEASURE
INCOME
PROPERLY
8.01 Revise Accounting
Rules for Production
Costs ........................................ X
8.02 Recognize Gain on 
Pledges of Installment 
Obligations .............................. X
8.03 Limit Use of Cash 
Method of Accounting .......... X
8.04 Repeal Reserve Method 
for Bad Debt
Deductions .............................. X
8.05 Repeal Mining and Solid 
Waste Reclamation and 
Closing Cost Deduction ........ X
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Support Oppose Recommend
Proposal Proposal Modification
CHAPTER 9. REVISE
TAXATION OF 
ENERGY AND  
NATURAL 
RESOURCES
9.02 Repeal Percentage 
Depletion ................................ X
9.03 Revise Minimum Tax on 
Intangible Drilling Costs . . . . X
9.04 Revise Royalty T axation........ X
CHAPTER 10. REFORM
TAXATION OF
FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS
Part A. Commercial Banks and 
Thrift Institutions
10.01 Repeal Special Rules for 
Depository Institution 
Bad Debt D eductions............ X
10.02 Deny Deduction for 
Interest to Carry Tax- 
Exempt Bonds ........................ X
10.03 Repeal Tax Exemption 
for Large Credit U n io n s ........ X
10.04 Repeal Reorganization 
Rules for Financially 
Troubled Thrift 
O rganizations.......................... X
10.05 Repeal Special Rules for 
Net Operating Losses of 
Depository Institutions.......... X
CHAPTER 12. MODIFY OTHER
SPECIFIC
SUBSIDIES
12.01 Repeal Tax Credit for 
Qualified R ehabilitation........ X
CHAPTER 13. CURTAIL TAX
SHELTERS
13.02 Extend At-Risk
Limitation to Real
E s ta te ........................................ X
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13.03 Revise Alternative 
Minimum Tax for Non­
corporate Taxpayers ..............
13.04 Revise Corporate 
Minimum T a x ..........................
CHAPTER 14. REVISE
TREATMENT OF
RETIREMENT
SAVINGS
14.01 Increase Spousal 
Individual Retirement 
Account Limit ........................
14.02 Unify Rules for 
Distributions from Tax- 
Favored Retirement 
Plans ........................................
14.03 Modify Deduction Rules 
for Tax-Favored 
Retirement P la n s ....................
14.04 Modify Annual Limits 
on Contributions and 
Benefits under Tax- 
Favored Plans ..........................
14.05 Apply Ten Percent 
Recapture Tax to 
Qualified Plan Assets 
Reverting to E m ployer..........
14.06 Revise Cash or Deferred 
Arrangement (Section 
401(k)) and Employer 
Matching Contribution 
Rules ........................................
14.07 Modify Rules for
Benefit Forfeitures..................
CHAPTER 15. REFORM INTER­
NATIONAL 
TAXATION
15.01 Reform Foreign Tax
Credit ............................
15.02 Modify Sourcing Rules
for Income and 
Deductions ....................
Support Oppose Recommend
Proposal Proposal Modification
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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15.03
15.04
15.05
Support Oppose Recommend
Proposal Proposal Modification
Replace Second 
Dividend and Interest
Taxes with Branch-Level
Tax ............................................
Revise Taxation of
X
Foreign Exchange Gains 
and Losses .............................. X
Reform the Mirror
System of Taxation for 
the United States
Possessions .............................. X
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND CONCLUSIONS
MORATORIUM
We urge those involved in the policy-making process to consider the likely 
effect of such a major systemic change on the national economy. It is our 
view that these effects have not been properly studied and quantified and 
that such a study should be an integral part of the 1985 tax reform effort.
Perhaps one of the more troublesome assertions in the original Treasury 
Department plan of November 1984 was the following:
Although it is possible to identify the industries that would lose special tax 
preferences, it is impossible to predict the precise economic effects of the 
entire package of Treasury Department proposals on all industries and indi­
viduals in the economy. Although many mathematical models of the econ­
omy exist, economic science simply is not sufficiently precise to allow accu­
rate prediction of the effects of reforms as fundamental and pervasive as 
those proposed by the Treasury Department; accordingly, this Report con­
tains no such attempt at precise quantification of economic effects, (vol. I, 
p. 43)
At the time the Administration released its plan in May of this year, there 
was discussion that macroeconomic studies should be undertaken, with the 
results of the studies being publicly released.
To date, we do not have the Treasury’s views on the macroeconomic ef­
fects of this plan. This should be unacceptable to Congress and the Ameri­
can public.
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The AICPA has previously testified in support of a moratorium on tax 
legislation and continues to support that position. Within the past decade, 
the 1976 Tax Reform Act, the 1978 Revenue Act, the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, the 
1984 Deficit Reduction Act, and several technical corrections acts (with 
that for the 1984 law still to come) have all entered the tax code in the name 
of reform, fairness, or economic growth. How successful they may have 
been in those contexts might well be the subject of discussion; but what is 
clear is that they have also left us with rapidly escalating complexity, in­
stability in our tax structure, and a growing despair by taxpayers. The abil­
ity of taxpayers to comply with the law, as well as make business decisions 
affected by the law, is impaired by frequent, sweeping tax reforms.
We therefore urge—at the very least—that any major tax legislation not 
be enacted until such time as its macroeconomic effects are analyzed, pub­
licized, and debated. All of us—as policymakers, practitioners, taxpayers, 
and citizens—have too much at stake in the economic impact of the deci­
sions being considered to be granted less.
We support reform to achieve greater fairness and simplicity. We also 
favor stabilizing the system. Relatively few changes to substantive law per­
mit individual and business taxpayers to understand and live with the rules. 
In turn, better compliance and better tax administration is bound to flow 
from such stability.
Therefore, in addition to delaying structural change pending debate on 
the macroeconomic issues, we urge that the ultimate action by this Con­
gress be coupled with a moratorium on future tax legislation for a reason­
able period of time.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TAX 
SIMPLIFICATION
The AICPA previously urged the appointment of a nonpartisan national 
commission on tax simplification, and we reiterate that recommendation. 
We urge that such a commission address the claims of both the proponents 
and critics of the proposals, and render for the benefit of the public and 
Congress findings on the impact of the proposed changes on the economy. 
The commission would also appraise the complexities that would be intro­
duced by the proposals of the Administration and by other proposed legis­
lation. As stated in our earlier oral testimony, “nobody should have a 
vested interest in tax complexity.”
We recommend that, in considering the proposals, the parties to the debate 
reflect upon whether there is a compelling need to repudiate what has been 
done by Congress in recent years to make the tax system more fair and simple. 
Change, unless clearly needed, does not seem to be desirable.
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IMMEDIATE NECESSARY REFORM
If it is determined that immediate change is necessary, the AICPA believes 
that certain aspects of the proposals would be a welcome addition to the tax 
system and urges that they be considered for adoption. We refer to the 
proposed increases in the exemptions and zero bracket amounts, which 
would remove a large number of low-income individuals from the system 
and also would reduce the number of itemizers. These proposals are wholly 
consistent with the AICPA’s desire for simplification and fairness.
Furthermore, we urge Congress to consider a series of safe harbors for 
small businesses. Individual income tax reporting would be greatly sim­
plified by this approach, since most small businesses are conducted in unin­
corporated form and are reflected on the proprietor’s individual tax return.
In addition, we urge a concentrated effort to curtail the underground 
economy. This is an area where tax reform should be concerned, but which 
the Administration’s plan does not address. Although a reduction in mar­
ginal tax rates may reduce the underreporting of income now present in the 
system, the degree of its impact is unclear. In this connection, see the spe­
cific comments and recommendations contained in the AICPA’s report on 
Underreported Taxable Income: The Problem and Possible Solutions, Janu­
ary 1983.
EFFECT ON STABILITY OF TAX SYSTEM
The plan adopts as its goals fairness, economic growth, and simplicity. 
Lower tax rates and tax neutrality are also sought. There would be little 
controversy if the individual proposals, contained within the plan, main­
tained a harmonious balance among these goals; if economic disruptions 
were kept to a bare minimum; and if economic growth was the reasonably 
certain ultimate outcome. However, the proposals do embody trade-offs 
and internal inconsistencies.
The proposals are a product of the choices between goals that are not 
necessarily always compatible. The Administration acknowledges the pos­
sibility of economic disruptions if this plan is enacted. Such economic dis­
ruptions are likely because the tax system has historically been used to 
offer incentives to encourage or discourage certain economic behavior. 
Withdrawal of such incentives might have a reverse impact.
It should also be noted that justification for a proposal often refers to the 
relatively small number of taxpayers who would be affected. We believe, 
however, that such a statistic is only a partial analysis of the consequences 
of its adoption. The issue should extend to the impact of repeal on the 
industry to which the incentive relates, its workers, its suppliers, the states 
in which the industry is located, and the like.
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The AICPA believes that we should strive to restore the respect of our 
citizens for our tax laws. We also believe that this effort would be seriously 
undermined if, in the face of predictions of economic disruptions, Congress 
adopted a new “tax neutral” system, and thereafter forsakes the principle 
of tax neutrality. Consequently, we believe it is urgent that Congress, in 
evaluating the plan, determine whether tax neutrality is a principle by 
which tax policy should be set. Congress may conclude that it will be bound 
to grant tax incentives in the future, as it has in the past, to counter reces­
sions, unemployment, stagnation of capital investment, or an energy crisis. 
If it so decides, then adopting a neutral tax system as a temporary expedi­
ent would, we believe, engender further taxpayer cynicism.
For example, the Administration has supported passage of enterprise 
zone legislation, which clearly is a nonneutral tax incentive. Enterprise 
zone legislation may be wholly justified by economic need. In the future, 
other stimulants to taxpayer conduct may be justified by economic need. 
Congress may pass a form of the Administration’s plan, find that certain 
industries have been severely harmed, and then put together a tax incentive 
package to mitigate the consequences. That too may be justified by eco­
nomic need. We believe that such an approach would undermine confi­
dence in our tax system.
We would urge both Congress and the Treasury to put a higher priority 
on simplicity in the tax laws, especially for individuals and small busi­
nesses. In the last twenty-two years, there have been nineteen major legis­
lative changes in tax laws. Each change has not only complicated the Inter­
nal Revenue Code but has also made its administration more complex and 
has contributed to systemic instability. With each change the Internal Reve­
nue Service must modify its tax processing system, its compliance pro­
grams, its tax forms (often adding new forms), and its regulations (adding 
to a backlog of regulations projects); it also must reeducate IRS agents and 
inform taxpayers. In short, the flood of major tax law changes has contrib­
uted substantially to a complex and confusing tax system.
EFFECT ON TAX ACCOUNTING
Within the tax accounting area of the Administration’s tax reform plan, 
there are several issues that need to be evaluated: what principles are being 
introduced into the tax accounting framework, is there a clear understand­
ing of these principles, and are they being consistently applied?
The plan often selectively ignores the policies underlying historical in­
come tax accounting; and the concepts that are being introduced into the 
tax accounting framework are often confused with financial statement prin­
ciples that serve a separate and distinct purpose. Furthermore, the plan 
lacks consistent treatment and reasoning among the various proposals.
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Historically, tax accounting concepts have been based on revenue needs, 
social goals, and practical applications that have developed over time. 
These concepts change as goals and circumstances change.
Two concepts that appear to be advocated by the Administration for in­
clusion or expansion within the tax accounting framework are matching of 
income and expenses between or among taxpayers, and selective confor­
mity between tax and financial statement accounting methods.1
Matching of income and deductions is cited as a reason for change in 
chapter 8.01, which would revise the accounting rules for production costs, 
and in chapter 8.03, which would limit use of the cash method of 
accounting.
The historical concept of matching requires recognition of related in­
come and expense items of a single taxpayer within the same accounting 
period. The plan does acknowledge this concept but attempts instead to 
apply it among multiple taxpayers.
Chapter 8.01 would require the capitalization of all business/production 
expenses with four exceptions. In effect, this proposal would defer cur­
rently deductible expenses. Chapter 8.03 would make accrual method ac­
counting mandatory for many taxpayers, large and small, engaged in serv­
ice businesses. The predominant effect on these taxpayers would be the 
acceleration of income not yet received and possibly the deferral of ex­
penses already paid. At the same time, the Administration’s plan, in chap­
ter 8.04, proposes to repeal the reserve method of accounting for bad 
debts, which does provide matching and follows financial statement ac­
counting. The alternative, the specific charge-off method, results in a mis­
matching of income and expense.
The second principle, conformity between tax and financial statement 
accounting methods, is also inconsistently applied. For example, the pro­
posal to limit use of the cash method of accounting states, “Because of its 
inadequacies, the cash method of accounting is not considered to be in 
accord with generally accepted accounting principles and, therefore, is not 
permissible for financial accounting purposes.”2
In the very next proposal, chapter 8.04, the plan proposes to repeal the 
reserve method of accounting for bad debts. The reserve method is in ac­
cordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), yet the 
plan fails to mention the need for conformity in this area. In fact, it seeks 
nonconformity.
1Other accounting principles are also addressed within the plan but these two are the most 
significant. Additional comments on tax accounting issues are included in the following spe­
cific comments section.
2The cash method of accounting is considered another comprehensive method of accounting 
and is permissible for financial statement purposes.
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This is further complicated by chapter 7.04, which would repeal the re­
quirement for conformity between the financial statement and tax treat­
ment of the LIFO method of inventory accounting. We support this pro­
posal because it acknowledges that conformity between tax and financial 
statement accounting is not necessarily appropriate in all cases. In fact, the 
U.S. Supreme Court recently noted that the attraction to require confor­
mity between accounting methods used for taxable income and preparing 
financial statements is only superficial.3
Financial reporting to the creditors and owners of a business serves a 
separate and distinct purpose from the reporting of taxable income. Be­
cause of the different objectives between financial reporting and tax report­
ing, accrual method tax accounting is often inconsistent with accrual ac­
counting under GAAP. Financial accounting, in accordance with GAAP, 
requires the recognition of the effects of a transaction on the assets and 
liabilities of the business in the time period to which the transaction relates, 
rather than when the cash is received or disbursed. Principles of tax ac­
counting, which are often based on cash flow accounting, contradict this. 
Taxable income for accrual method taxpayers rarely agrees with income for 
accrual method financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP.
Through the blending of conformity and nonconformity proposals, and 
matching and mismatching proposals, the underlying concepts of tax ac­
counting become muddled. These proposals are a continuation of a dis­
turbing trend of the past number of years: a movement to tax income at the 
earlier of the date received or accrued, while deferring expense deduct­
ibility until actually paid.
EFFECT ON THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF 
GOVERNMENT
An issue that should be addressed in evaluating the Administration’s tax 
reform plan is the impact of the plan on the interrelationship between 
federal, state, and local governments.
The plan would cut indirect subsidies to state and local governments, 
make it more difficult for state and local governments to raise or even col­
lect taxes, and impede their ability to finance projects and programs. We 
feel the desired federal and state relationship needs to be defined. In addi­
tion, the implications and complications of this plan with regard to that 
relationship need further study.
3Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 (1979).
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Within an overall framework, the government must meet certain respon­
sibilities to the people and generate adequate revenue to fund its activities. 
The relationship of federal and state governments is defined by the division 
of these responsibilities and the opportunities at each level to generate 
revenue.
Throughout history, this relationship has been shaped and reshaped 
through federal policy. In very recent years we have seen an impetus away 
from a strong centralized national government and towards statism—states 
taking greater responsibility for the needs of residents. This is especially 
apparent from recent federal budget decisions. This tax reform plan fur­
ther demonstrates the Administration’s intent to cut federal subsidies and 
involvement and leave state governments with greater responsibility.
In analyzing the Administration’s plan, many implications, complica­
tions, and technical problems must therefore be considered. For example: 
how does this plan help or hinder the relationship of federal and state gov­
ernments; how will state governments fund the additional responsibilities; 
and what effect will this shift have on the economy? By examining several 
of the proposals within the plan, these concerns are highlighted.
Chapter 3.09 of the Administration’s plan calls for the repeal of the de­
duction for all state and local income taxes and other state and local taxes 
not incurred in carrying on a trade, business, or income-producing activity.
This proposal will have the heaviest impact on taxpayers living in high- 
tax states who itemize deductions. It could result in public pressure to 
lower state tax rates to make taxpayers economically whole, or it might 
result in population or business relocation to lower-tax states.
For high-tax states, this proposal could mean greater responsibility allo­
cated from the federal government and impeded ability to raise tax revenue 
(either from population or business outflow or from reduced tax rates). For 
low-tax states, this proposal could mean greater responsibility for existing 
residents, as well as inflowing residents, and greater difficulty in increasing 
tax rates to meet these new demands.
This proposal coupled with recent federal budget decisions would greatly 
restrict state governments’ financial ability to meet increasing 
responsibilities.
Chapter 3.06 of the Administration’s plan would require the inclusion in 
income of all unemployment compensation and all cash payments for dis­
ability from workers’ compensation and black lung (with limited excep­
tions). Presently, most of these benefits are untaxed. If this proposal is 
enacted, these benefits may have to be increased to yield the same after-tax 
dollars. With the current trend towards statism, this responsibility would 
probably shift to the state. This proposal would represent another financial 
burden to be placed on the state and local governments.
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Chapter 11.01 would repeal the tax-exempt status of interest on state and 
local government obligations if more than one percent of the proceeds were 
used directly or indirectly by any person other than a state or local govern­
ment. Under an exception to the general rule, use of tax-exempt financed 
facilities by a nongovernment person would be permissible if the facilities 
were available for use by the general public on the same basis. This pro­
posal would affect industrial development bonds (IDBs), mortgage subsidy 
bonds, and other nongovernmental bonds.
State governments now use IDBs to enhance incentives or offset detri­
mental factors, in order to attract business into the state. IDBs are also 
used to encourage private business to perform public services. This pro­
posal may force many states to perform public services previously per­
formed by private business, and—particularly in concert with repealing 
employees’ state tax deductions—may also result in a shift in business from 
high- to low-tax-rate states.
This proposal would impede state governments’ abilities to finance their 
projects and programs, and could have dramatic effects on the economy as 
a whole.
Chapter 10.02 would deny all (rather than 80 percent) of deductions by 
banks, thrifts, and other financial institutions of interest payments alloca­
ble to the purchase or carrying of tax-exempt obligations.
Another issue not addressed in the Administration’s plan, but which 
should be considered, is “piggybacking”—where states tie their definition 
of tax base to the federal definition of tax base. If this plan is adopted by 
the federal government, there will be provisions within the package that 
may not be acceptable to state governments. These provisions would be 
revenue losers at the state level and would require either an increase in 
state taxes or an adjustment to the federal tax base in determining the state 
tax base. The latter is more likely but would increase overall tax complexity 
rather than simplifying tax reporting requirements for taxpayers.
States currently exchange tax data with the federal government to assure 
tax compliance, thus more adjustments to the federal base will require 
additional independent verification by the state. Additional adjustments to 
the federal base will result in an increased audit burden, and thus financial 
burden, for the states.
In addition, while we support the reduction of federal marginal tax rates, 
it should be recognized that their implementation will make tax-exempt 
state and local bonds less desirable. The below-market rate of interest cur­
rently paid on these bonds, will have to be increased to compete with exist­
ing market rates, adding further cost burdens to state and local 
government.
The Administration’s plan will affect the interrelationship of governmen­
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tal units, and will require a new approach to state and municipal finance. 
Congress should have a high degree of confidence in the likely economic 
and behavioral effects of these provisions before enacting them.
EFFECT ON SIMPLIFICATION
Much of the current complexity in the Internal Revenue Code and the tax 
system is due to constant, major tax law changes. Simplicity is enhanced by 
the application of consistent tax rules and will be difficult to achieve if these 
rules are in constant transformation.
In addition to representing yet another potential change to the system, 
the current proposals also contain provisions that clearly add to the current 
level of complexity. This complexity is highlighted by an examination of 
several of the proposals.
The plan eliminates one itemized deduction, state and local taxes, and 
combines various business and miscellaneous deductions, which are then 
subject to a reduction of one percent of modified adjusted gross income. 
Some taxpayers will realize simplification through an increase in the zero 
bracket amount since itemizing will not be beneficial for them. However, 
many of these taxpayers will still need to calculate whether itemizing is 
more beneficial and will still need to maintain records for that purpose. 
Also, the new miscellaneous deduction category requires a further 
calculation.
In addition, more complicated rules for the deductibility of interest ex­
pense are proposed. Some taxpayers will have to calculate net investment 
income in order to determine the amount of interest, other than principal 
home mortgage interest, he or she may deduct.
The plan also proposes revisions in the alternative minimum tax (AMT) 
for both corporate and noncorporate taxpayers. Although we agree with 
the policy objectives of both a corporate and an individual minimum tax, 
these particular proposals unnecessarily complicate the computation of the 
preference items. The tightening of the AMT under these proposals will 
also increase the number of taxpayers subject to AMT. Affected taxpayers 
will be required to apply two different sets of rules to the same items of 
income and expense. While some additional complexity for the sake of 
greater equity is acceptable, this proposal creates significant complexity, 
and the price is too great. Nevertheless, if AMTs are pursued, rules for 
broad uniform concepts should be developed.
The proposal to deny a rate reduction benefit attributable to excess de­
preciation, with its inherent retroactivity, imposes additional recordkeep­
ing requirements and contributes to complexity. Moreover, this concept of
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multiple-year retroactivity violates fundamental principles of fairness and 
has not heretofore been a part of our tax system.
The proposals affecting the taxation of the investment in business prop­
erty and capital assets, according to the Administration, are geared to­
wards providing “incentives in a relatively neutral manner in order to limit 
investment distortions created under current law.” Moreover by so doing, 
these provisions affecting depreciation, capital gains, “excess” depreciation 
recapture as well as interest limitations and the 10 percent dividend paid 
deduction unnecessarily add more recordkeeping and complexity to an al­
ready complex area of the code.
If change is indeed needed in this area, there are other alternatives avail­
able that will not add to the complexity of the code. For example, signifi­
cant relief from recordkeeping requirements can be obtained through uti­
lizing the previous depreciation guidelines and providing open-end, 
multiyear, multiple asset accounts for broad classes of depreciable prop­
erty. This system would be desirable because it would provide simplicity for 
the actual depreciation calculation, prescribed lives, no salvage values, no 
indexation, no separate accounting for retirement, ease of recordkeeping, 
and the half-year convention.
The Administration acknowledges the simplicity of this “open end” de­
preciation method when it states on page 151 of its proposal that “consid­
eration would be given to simplifying taxpayer accounting by permitting an 
election to maintain open accounts for certain classes of CCRS property.”
An open-end depreciation system would aid the Administration’s objec­
tives of neutral investment incentives and the mitigation of inflation. Fur­
thermore, the open-end system would add some simplification.
SPECIFIC COMMENTS
CHAPTER 7. REDUCE MARGINAL TAX RATES
1.01—Reduce Marginal Tax Rates
The proposed reduction in the number of tax brackets from 14 to 3 would 
simplify the tax law. We support the concepts of base broadening and 
lowering of tax rates provided they are consistent with sound fiscal and 
economic policy. However, the size of the rate reductions and the number 
of tax brackets should be further evaluated in terms of fairness among 
taxpayers.
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CHAPTER 2. INCREASE FAIRNESS FOR 
FAMILIES
2.01—Increase Zero Bracket Amount and Personal 
Exemptions
This proposal achieves simplification by reducing the number of individuals 
who will be required to file tax returns and pay tax. A fairer means of 
achieving this goal and simplifying the tax structure would be a standard tax 
credit instead of an increased personal exemption deduction. This would 
also provide greater equity to lower income taxpayers since credits provide 
equal benefits, while deductions provide greater benefits to taxpayers in 
higher marginal tax brackets.
We recommend consideration of a standard tax credit in place of the 
personal exemption. If that is not feasible, then we would support this 
proposal.
2.02—Elderly, Blind, and Disabled Credit
This proposal is an excellent approach to replace personal exemptions for 
the elderly, blind, and disabled with a corresponding credit.
The disability credit provisions are simpler and more equitable than the 
current statutes. They will increase benefits to those who need them most 
by increasing the “initial base amount,” by being a credit instead of a de­
duction, and by phasing out increases as income rises. The computation, 
however, is still complex. Further simplification could be achieved by doing 
away with the exemption, dropping the proposed credit, and just raising 
the threshold level for taxation. Thus, provisions 2.01 and 2.02 could be 
made to work in tandem.
2.03—Repeal Two-Earner Deduction
This provision simplifies the code at the price of reduced equity. Flattening 
the rates will alleviate some of the “marriage penalty,” but will not compen­
sate for the loss of this provision.
We oppose this proposal. It affects a very large and very important group 
of taxpayers and involves what is perceived as an extremely significant issue 
of fairness.
2.05—Replace Child and Dependent Care Credit With 
Deduction
By replacing a credit with a deduction, the underlying social benefit of this 
tax policy is diluted. The desirability of this dilution must be analyzed in 
terms of the primary purpose of the credit.
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If the primary purpose of the credit is to assist low bracket wage earners 
with dependents, it would seem that no social or other justifiable goals are 
achieved by permitting either a deduction or a credit to “high bracket” 
wage earners. For this reason, we oppose the proposal. To achieve socially 
justifiable goals, this relief provision should be retained as a credit and 
phased out with increasing levels of income.
CHAPTER 3. MAKE THE SYSTEM MORE 
NEUTRAL AND FAIR
3.02—Repeal $5,000 Exclusion for
Employer-Provided. Death Benefits
This proposal would repeal the $5,000 exclusion for employer-furnished 
death benefits because it is considered an artificial preference for compen­
sation paid in this form. There is also confusion concerning the employee’s 
family’s tax treatment of the $5,000 death benefit.
We agree with the proposal to repeal this provision in order to simplify 
the Internal Revenue Code. Even though it is not a complex rule, it is of 
little consequence to taxpayers in general. Unless there is substantial rea­
son for a special tax provision, it should be eliminated.
3.06—Repeal Exclusion for Unemployment and 
Disability Payments
The non- or partial taxation of these payments has provided a subsidy from 
the U.S. Treasury. From a fiscal standpoint, there appears to be no good 
reason why this subsidy should continue since it is in reality a wage sub­
stitute. Workmen’s compensation is also a wage substitute and should be 
similarly taxed, but only for future injuries (as provided by the proposal). 
We also note that the proposal is unclear concerning the treatment of dis­
ability payments where the individual taxpayer, rather than the employer, 
has paid the insurance premium.
No arguments or justifications appear to exist, however, for taxing black 
lung benefits and service-related payments received for injuries previously 
incurred. Prospective application is fairer and would cause much less social 
and economic upheaval. It is unrealistic to assume, as the proposal does, 
that these types of benefits can be automatically adjusted.
An issue of fairness may also exist relating to taxing payments at a time 
when the recipient is otherwise already unemployed or disabled.
We support this provision provided black lung and service-related bene­
fits are taxed on a prospective-injury basis only.
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3.07—Limit Scholarship and Fellowship Exclusion
The current provisions are complex and spawn much tax controversy. One 
would expect any reform to simplify and reduce or eliminate the controver­
sies. The proposed limit will not accomplish this. Arguments would still 
persist over degree versus non-degree status, what portions of a grant re­
late to excluded expenses, what are incidental expenses, and so on. Sim­
plification will not be achieved; indeed, this complex area may be made 
more complex.
Significant social and economic questions are raised by including or ex­
cluding awards or grants. Public policy may favor the granting of schol­
arships to academically deserving students, regardless of need. On the 
other hand, those who are in need should not be further taxed. To do so 
would seem to run contrary to the original rationale underlying the exclu­
sion as it now exists.
In order to achieve the social goal of fostering education, a “sliding” 
deduction should be retained for all scholarships and fellowships. Thus, the 
higher the recipient’s income, including the award, the lower the exclusion. 
Although this would introduce a new computation into the code, the con­
troversies over work requirements, degree status, and so on would be 
eliminated.
3.08—Repeal Exclusion for Prizes and Awards
This provision will promote horizontal equity. The receipt of such prize or 
award should be treated as taxable income, subject to a de minimus 
exclusion.
We support this provision if modified to retain an exclusion for a de 
minimus amount.
3.09—Repeal Deduction of State and Local Taxes
We oppose the Administration’s proposal to eliminate the itemized deduc­
tion for state and local taxes.
To require individuals to pay an income tax on the portion of their in­
come applied to the payment of state income taxes is, in effect, double 
taxation. Furthermore, state and local income taxes, and to a lesser extent 
real estate property taxes and sales taxes, constitute an assessment that is 
broadly applied and over which individuals may, in fact, exercise very little 
control. Many individuals are not truly free to choose the jurisdiction in 
which they are taxed.
It has been argued in support of elimination of the deduction that two 
thirds of Americans do not itemize, and therefore receive no benefit from 
the state and local tax deduction. The reason these Americans do not
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itemize deductions is that their state and local taxes, when combined with 
their other itemized deductions, do not exceed the zero bracket amount. 
Thus, they are getting up to the full benefit of a deduction for the state and 
local taxes they pay, through the availability of the zero bracket amount. Is 
it then fair to deny the higher tax jurisdiction taxpayer the benefit of de­
ductibility for the state and local taxes he or she pays?
It can also be argued that state and local income taxes are a cost of 
earning income and as a result should be deductible. Other such costs (for 
example, clothing and commuting) often can be increased or reduced 
based on the worker’s preferences. State and local income taxes, however, 
are a fixed cost that cannot be altered at the worker’s will and therefore 
differ from these other nondeductible costs of earning a living.
If the deduction for state and local taxes is eliminated, high-tax states will 
shift to other forms of taxation, thereby substantially diminishing the actual 
federal tax revenues to be derived from elimination of the deduction. States 
such as Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, and North Dakota currently 
fund certain state programs, such as education, by allowing a credit against 
state taxes for contributions to selected educational institutions. Such con­
tributions to selected educational institutions are deductible as charitable 
contributions at the federal level. State taxing schemes such as these will 
most certainly be expanded and improved upon if the deduction for state 
and local taxes is eliminated.
3.11—Limit Deduction for Entertainment and Business 
Meal Expenses
The entertainment expense deduction is an area susceptible to abuse and 
perceived to be unfair. Accordingly, we support the proposed elimination 
of entertainment expense deductions.
We have different views, however, with regard to the proposed limit on 
deductions for business meals. We believe the problem of abuses in the 
business meal area should be addressed through stiffer audit techniques 
and stronger enforcement to encourage compliance with the present rules, 
not by an arbitrary limitation on meal deductions. (It should also be noted 
that limits on deductibility of business meals will complicate payroll and 
income tax reporting.)
3.13—Adjust Tax Rate on Unearned Income of Minor 
Children
Under this proposal, unearned income received by minor children under 
the age of fourteen attributable to property received from the child’s par­
ents would be taxed at the parents’ marginal tax rate. The Administration’s
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plan states that income splitting to utilize lower marginal tax rates under­
mines the progressive rate structure. It further contends that this is a source 
of unfairness in the current tax system since the ability to shift investment 
income to children primarily benefits the wealthy. However, the wealthy 
will be able to mitigate the effects of this proposal, by either causing gifts to 
be made by grandparents and other relatives, rather than parents, or defer­
ring major gifts until the minor child reaches fourteen years of age.
The proposal increases the complexity, rather than simplifying the deter­
mination of a minor’s income tax liability. Under current law, when deter­
mining the taxable income of a minor who is a dependent, it is necessary to 
divide the income between earned and unearned income. The proposal 
further complicates this existing structure by creating two categories of un­
earned income, labeled “unearned income from a qualified segregated ac­
count,” and “unearned income attributable to property transferred by par­
ents.” The proposal places a premium on good bookkeeping and creates a 
trap for the uninformed.
We oppose this proposal as it adds undue complexity and does not repre­
sent a significant improvement over the existing system of taxation.
3.14—Revise Grantor and Non-Grantor Trust Taxation
This proposal would completely change the basic principles of the income 
taxation of trusts. We have serious concerns about this proposal and believe 
it should not be included in a comprehensive tax reform package for the 
following reasons:
1. One of the aims of the proposal is to prevent the loss of revenue by 
the creation of multiple trusts by the same grantor. The 1984 Tax Re­
form Act previously added section 643(e) to the Internal Revenue 
Code, which requires the consolidation for income tax purposes of 
multiple trusts for the same beneficiaries. Consequently, we feel fur­
ther legislation is unnecessary in this area.
2. With respect to trusts that accumulate income, the reintroduction of 
the capital gains throwback rule and the elimination of the exception 
of the throwback rules for minors would add substantial complexity to 
the law. These provisions were previously included in the law but were 
repealed in 1976 because of their complexity. The current rules should 
not be changed.
3. The proposed changes in the rules for grantor trusts would be unfair, 
would add undue complexity, and are not warranted.
a. The elimination of the Clifford Trust rules would be unfair. Al­
though the wealthy are in a position to make outright gifts or trans­
fers in trusts, those with more moderate means use a short-term or
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Clifford Trust. In the short-term trust, the assets are returned to 
the grantor at the termination of the trust. Generally, short-term 
trusts are used when a person wants to benefit a child or other 
relative but cannot afford to permanently give up the property.
b. Under current law, a trustee of an irrevocable trust may be given 
discretion to shift income among beneficiaries or, where necessary, 
to accumulate income. Income that is accumulated is taxed to the 
trust. Income that is distributed is taxed to the beneficiary who 
receives it. The proposal would not allow a distribution deduction 
for this type of discretionary trust during the grantor’s life. These 
trusts are generally used to take care of dependents with dis­
abilities or those having difficulties handling their own affairs. If 
the income-producing property were given outright to these bene­
ficiaries, the income would be taxed to them. We feel the same 
result should follow if the assets are put in an irrevocable trust. 
Delaying the deductibility by the trust of such distributions until 
after the death of the grantor is not warranted.
c. The proposals would be effective for all trusts beginning in 1986. 
Changes as extensive as these should be phased in over a period of 
time. People should be given time to amend current trusts and wills 
to take into account the new provisions. Further, existing irrev­
ocable grantor trusts should be grandfathered.
4. The proposals would violate the right of privacy and confidentiality of 
tax return information. Creators of trusts and the trustees of all trusts 
created by them would have to share information pertaining to their 
taxable income in order to properly compute tax. This will have par­
ticularly unsettling ramifications in these days of frequent divorces 
and multiple families because of trusts created for former spouses and 
children. Additionally, there could be a reduction in the use of third- 
party independent trustees because of the need for the grantor to 
provide them with information about his or her income.
5. The preparation of trust returns could be delayed, or taxes paid at 
unfairly high rates, if the grantor or one trustee lacked a single item of 
information to complete the preparation of his or her returns. Also, 
presumably, a change as the result of an IRS audit to the grantor’s 
return would require the filing of amended fiduciary income tax 
returns.
6. The proposals disregard a long-standing principle of tax law—namely, 
income is taxable to the owner of the property generating it. By pro­
posing to tax all trusts at the grantor’s rates, the separate legal entity 
of the trust is not given full recognition. Further, these proposals 
would thwart and frustrate the many valid non-tax uses of trusts.
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We oppose this proposal because of the undue complexity it would add. 
However, we recognize that abuses in the trust area exist and that reform is 
needed. This problem area should be studied with a view to recommending 
changes to curb identified abuses and achieve fairness.
3.15—Revise Income Taxation of Estates
The main thrust of this proposal is to eliminate “abuse,” with respect to 
estate income taxation, resulting from the judicious election of fiscal years 
for estates and trusts. If planned properly under current law, it is possible 
to defer the payment of income tax for more than two years. We agree that 
the ability to elect a taxable year-end different than the decedent’s can be 
considered an abuse and should be eliminated.
The proposal would also extend a decedent’s final taxable year to the end 
of the taxable year in which his death occurs. Distributions to beneficiaries 
during this first extended period would not result in a distribution deduc­
tion on the decedent’s final return. The estate, as a separate taxpayer, 
would in effect, come into existence on the first day of the taxable year 
beginning after the decedent’s final, extended taxable year.
While we can agree with the change in year-end for decedents, we be­
lieve that an income tax deduction should be allowed for distributions from 
a decedent’s estate, as well as from trusts, in the year of death. Income 
distributed from an estate for family support should be taxed to the recip­
ient. Further, trust income, which is required to be distributed after death 
to another, should also be taxed to the recipient. Not allowing the deduc­
tion may delay the distribution of needed funds for the support of family 
members or other beneficiaries of an estate or trust.
Although we agree with that portion of the proposal pertaining to fiscal 
years of estates, we disagree with other substantive sections that would add 
undue complexity and inequity to the present law.
CHAPTER 4. REDUCE RECORDKEEPING AND  
COMPLEXITY
4.01—Impose Floor on Employee Business Expense 
and Other Miscellaneous Deductions
The proposal to limit miscellaneous deductions appears to be one of sim­
plifying enforcement, rather than simplifying the tax law itself. We believe 
that if an employee has a legitimate business expense, he or she should be 
allowed to deduct that expense along with others incurred in producing 
income. The rationale that these items should not be deductible under a
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one percent of adjusted gross income floor does not simplify the tax law 
because it still requires that taxpayers consider these deductions to deter­
mine whether or not they will exceed the one percent floor. The major 
implied advantage seems to be that the IRS would not have to audit as 
many deductions. Although the proposal would broaden the tax base and 
thus allow lower marginal rates, it would be inequitable to those taxpayers 
who have ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in producing income. 
The inequity created outweighs the advantage of broadening the tax base.
We oppose this proposal.
4.04—Repeal Adoption Expense Deduction
This proposal would simplify the code. It is doubtful whether most couples 
consider the deduction as a major factor in determining whether to adopt 
children with special needs.
We support this proposal.
4.05—Repeal Income Averaging
The complete repeal of the income averaging provisions would certainly 
result in simplification, since the computations are not easily made or un­
derstood. Furthermore, litigation would be reduced, since eligibility and 
base-year income issues would disappear.
Since the recent changes to the base-year and computational method, 
the current provision arguably could be seen as benefitting primarily high- 
income earners.
Also, the distortions and inequities in tax paid, when the top bracket was 
70 percent will not be present when rates are lowered and the brackets are 
expanded.
We support this proposal if accompanied by rate reduction and the ex­
pansion of brackets.
4.06—Simplify Penalty Provisions
We agree that the penalty provisions of the code should be restructured to 
provide simplification, ease of administration, and fairness in their applica­
tion. Moreover, the plan eliminates a significant amount of the vagueness 
contained in “Treasury I.” However, as pointed out below, the proposal 
would still be inequitable in certain respects, and thus counterproductive to 
the fairness objective.
The plan does not seem to address some important penalties, such as 
that for underpayment of estimated tax. To be effective, it should clarify 
which of the present penalties are included.
The proposal also does not contain a provision allowing the waiver of
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penalties by district directors or others for reasonable cause. While it may 
be simpler to have a system that does not allow for the waiver of penalties, 
such a system cannot be considered fair or equitable.
Failure to file information return or furnish statement. Underlying the entire 
simplification program, there seems to be an increasing tendency to shift 
much of the burden of reporting and collection to business. Further, busi­
ness incurs costs that continue to increase as reporting requirements be­
come stricter. Already, filers of certain forms 1099 reporting payments to 
more than fifty payees must file these returns via magnetic tape. Increased 
matching—particularly instantaneous matching for tax computation under 
the Administration’s concept of a return-free system—will probably require 
most businesses to use this method of reporting. The costs to a small or 
even medium-sized business could be prohibitive.
Under the concept of the return-free system, matching of documents by 
the IRS would be mandatory. However, based on the matching process in 
existence currently, many improvements must occur. Documents and 
notices of additional tax due are frequently processed for returns that have 
accurately reported the correct income.
Because of these problems, the proposed penalty ($100 for each com­
bined failure to file/furnish) with no maximum is potentially onerous, espe­
cially for small business. The present $50,000 penalty cap is therefore 
necessary.
Furnishing “incorrect information” on a return or statement. The provision 
is too vague. For example, the effect of filing an amended return has not, as 
we see it, been considered as a mitigating circumstance.
Cost-of-collection charge. This provision is also too vague. Does it imply a 
set fee or the actual incremental cost to the government in each individual 
circumstance? Will a taxpayer be charged $1,000, for example, to collect a 
$10 penalty? Would there be a cost of collecting the prior cost of collecting? 
Would the penalty be assessed if the tax were not collected?
Effective date. The proposed effective date—returns due on or after Janu­
ary 1, 1986—provides taxpayers, particularly those who must make altera­
tions to their data processing systems and equipment, with inadequate 
time. We suggest that the effective date be restated to taxable years begin­
ning after the date of enactment.
CONCLUSION
The proposals could be the basis for restructuring the penalty provisions, if 
there were explanatory definitions and examples of application that are not
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subject to various interpretations. In addition, to promote fairness, a provi­
sion to waive a penalty for reasonable cause must be provided.
Since a major reason for restructuring the penalty provisions is to in­
crease compliance, we suggest the IRS increase its informational and edu­
cational activities so that taxpayers are aware of their responsibilities (and 
the consequences of their failure to comply).
CHAPTER 5. SIMPLIFY THE SYSTEM OF 
FILING
5.01—Study Return-Free System
The bottom line of tax simplification requires consideration of changes in 
tax forms: how many forms, how complicated are they, is there ease of 
preparation by individuals, and is there improved processing by the IRS? 
To the extent our tax system removes taxpayers from the return-filing proc­
ess, simplification has occurred. This is clearly evident in the sales tax sys­
tem where retailers collect, pay over the tax, and file the return. The goal 
of a return-free income tax system for individuals is theoretically desirable; 
however, we believe it can be done only to a limited extent and even then 
with certain shortcomings as described below:
1. Judgment is required with respect to selecting accounting methods for 
taxpayers, for example: accrual vs. cash, inventory methods, bad debt 
timing, depreciation, installment sales, repair vs. capital, and so on.
2. Government policy has relied and will continue to rely on the tax 
system to provide social influence and relief through deductions for 
such items as charitable contributions, mortgage interest, medical ex­
penses, and retirement savings, as well as directing economic invest­
ment by providing special tax incentives.
3. Unreported income arising basically out of cash transactions cannot 
be addressed in a return-free system. For example, the estimated in­
come tax liability on unreported income by tax filers alone in 1981 
was $52 billion. A matter of concern to us is the possibility that a 
return-free system will encourage continuance and even expansion of 
such tax evasion.
Therefore, we believe a return-free system can only work with the low- 
income segment of taxpayers. Indeed, the Administration’s proposal recog­
nizes this with its emphasis on increased personal exemptions and reduc­
tion in eligible itemized deductions, providing a “standard” tax calculation 
based on wages, interest, and dividends. Removing an estimated 66 per­
cent of all taxpayers from tax return filing would be attainable. The obvious 
shortcoming, however, is the extent to which this segment contributes to
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the some $52 billion of unreported tax liability. Worse still, how many in 
this group will be encouraged to move into the unreported income segment 
via cash and bartering transactions because they no longer have to file a 
return?
Under the concept of the return-free system, matching of documents by 
the IRS would be mandatory. However, based on the matching process in 
existence currently, many improvements must occur. Again and again, doc­
uments and notices of additional tax due are processed for returns that 
correctly report the income. It is currently difficult for the IRS to deter­
mine that income is reported. Corrected 1099s rarely are processed and 
matched correctly, which creates problems for taxpayers. The taxpayer re­
ceives notices of tax due from failure by the IRS to match the items 
correctly.
Payroll and information returns are filed at different times with different 
agencies in different locations. Some are paper returns, others are on mag­
netic tape. Feeding this data into the system so that every service center 
would have access to every piece of information nationwide could not un­
der present (or forseeable) technology be accomplished to allow timely 
calculation of tax liability. If a taxpayer knew that six to nine months or 
more would elapse before a refund would be received, would any prudent 
person elect the “return free” system? If, on the other hand, he has to file a 
submission form with all the information enclosed to assure an accurate 
calculation of his tax liability, why not do it himself? Also, many taxpayers 
will want to calculate tax liability both with and without itemized deduc­
tions before deciding whether to elect the return-free system.
Anyone who owes taxes would make the election, but the government 
would stand to lose (at least in the first few years) by not collecting monies 
due until the calculation was made several months later, posing questions of 
penalty and interest on payments made after the due date. If the liability is 
not determined until, say September, how can any penalty be assessed? 
This would favor one segment of the taxpaying public over another and 
unfairly penalize the 34 percent of the taxpayers who calculate and pay 
their taxes timely.
We support the concept of a return-free system; however, the implemen­
tation presents a number of difficulties. We believe that prior to any imple­
mentation of a return-free system the following should be considered:
1. Expanding optical character recognition (OCR) capability at IRS 
service centers (as per form 1040EZ). Develop OCR technology as 
fully as possible.
2. Undertaking significant testing projects around the country to assess 
the feasibility of a return-free system for low-income taxpayers.
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CHAPTER 6. REVISE THE TAXATION OF 
CORPORATE INCOME
6.02—Reduce Double Taxation of Corporate Earnings 
Distributed to Shareholders
This proposal would provide corporations with a deduction for 10 percent 
of dividends paid to shareholders in an attempt to mitigate the double taxa­
tion of corporate earnings.
We support the concepts of parity and relief from double taxation; how­
ever, we cannot support this proposal. The 10 percent proposed deduction 
is too insignificant to justify the additional complexity and recordkeeping 
this proposal would require.
Additional Recordkeeping. This proposal does nothing to alleviate the de­
tailed records currently required to determine earnings and profits under 
section 312, but it would add additional rules and regulations for the ad­
ministration of a qualified dividend account (QDA).
Every corporation would be required to set up a QDA. The account 
would be increased each year by the taxable income of the corporation, 
decreased by taxable income that does not result in a tax liability due to the 
application of a credit, decreased by dividends paid (but not below zero), 
and decreased by liquidating and redeeming distributions.
The QDA recordkeeping requirements would not be as straightforward 
as they seem. For example, the calculation to decrease the account by the 
taxable income that does not result in a tax liability due to the application 
of a credit could be quite complex.
Another area of potential complexity is the treatment of a dividend de­
duction that results in a net operating loss carryback. Although this sounds 
simple in principle, it may be difficult to apply.
Additional Reporting Requirements. A corporation paying dividends to an­
other corporation would submit a report to the recipient stating what por­
tion of the dividend was paid out of the distributing corporation’s QDA. 
This additional reporting requirement would be necessary so that the re­
ceiving corporation would know if the 100 percent exclusion, the 90 percent 
exclusion, or something in between was appropriate.
Complexity in Redemptions and Liquidations. A literal reading of this pro­
posal implies that if the QDA were adequate in amount, the QDA would 
be reduced by the full amount of a distribution made in redemption. In a 
situation where a redeemed shareholder was merely recovering the tax
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basis in the stock, an unintended outcome would result. Thus, additional 
complex rules would be required to correctly handle redemption dis­
tributions.
Complexity Involving Reorganizations. The proposal indicates that rules 
would be provided to govern the transferability of the QDA in mergers and 
acquisitions. This will necessitate rules similar to those currently in effect 
to control trafficking of net operating loss carryovers. Structuring the rules 
to prohibit trafficking in QDAs will probably prove every bit as difficult 
and controversial as the long struggle to reform section 382.
Elimination of Additional Complexity. If the goal is to avoid double taxa­
tion of corporate income, a simple solution is the complete elimination of 
the corporate income tax. However, such a solution would obviously have 
far-reaching political implications and is probably not practical at this time 
of high federal deficits.
Summary Comments. We question whether this provision will accomplish 
the goals outlined. First, the proposal notes that the current law encour­
ages debt over equity financing. Since interest is deductible, the aggregate 
tax of the corporation and investor cannot exceed 50 percent. This is in 
contrast to equity where the aggregate tax, because of double taxation, can 
exceed 70 percent. We agree that this 20 percent spread between the two 
methods does encourage debt financing; however, we question whether the 
proposal would correct this bias. Even if the lower individual rates, lower 
corporate rates, and dividend deduction of the Treasury plan are accepted, 
there would still be a spread of 18 percent favoring debt financing. (This 
merely reflects the fact that the deduction for dividends is only one tenth of 
the dividend paid.)
Additionally, there are other reasons why debt is preferred over equity 
investments: debt is generally senior in liquidation rights; it usually repre­
sents a fixed income stream; and in many cases it is less sensitive to changes 
in value due to market conditions. Finally, and perhaps more important, an 
investor can liquidate debt without any question of whether the distribu­
tion is ordinary income in the form of a dividend.
A second reason offered for the change is that under current law it is 
difficult to distinguish debt from equity. Nothing in this proposal would 
clarify that admittedly vague distinction. For the reasons stated above, 
there will still be incentives for investors to want to hold debt, and there 
will still be questions of whether that debt is really equity.
The proposal also notes that in considering a dividend, corporations are 
concerned with whether their shareholders are low- or relatively high- 
marginal-rate taxpayers. In our experience, this is a purely theoretical ar­
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gument. Most corporations do not concern themselves with this question, 
and, even if they did, the proposal only mitigates the problem. It does not 
change it.
Finally, the proposal states that the current law discourages the use of the 
corporate form of business because of double taxation. Again, this is a 
theoretical consideration. We believe that the primary purpose for choos­
ing a form other than the corporate form is to pass business losses directly 
through to investors. This proposal would not alter that incentive.
To the extent this proposal eliminates some of the double taxation, it 
would benefit corporations and shareholders. However, we do not expect it 
would result in a sudden change of preference away from S corporations or 
the partnership form of business.
6.03—Repeal $100/$200 Dividend Income Exclusion
Repeal of the dividend income exclusion would result in some simplifica­
tion. This change would affect individual taxpayers who are investors in 
equity instruments. As an incentive to stimulate investments in stock, the 
dividend exclusion is too small to be considered a viable incentive. The 
effect of its repeal on investment strategies or stock market performance 
would be nominal.
We support this proposal.
CHAPTER 7—REVISE TAXATION OF BUSINESS 
PROPERTY AND CAPITAL 
ASSETS
7.01—Adopt New Capital Cost Recovery System
Despite the Administration’s efforts to redress perceived imbalances be­
tween the capital-intensive and labor-intensive segments of the economy, 
we must oppose the proposed new Capital Cost Recovery System (CCRS). 
Recognizing the concerns for cost of capital expressed last fall in Treasury 
I, as well as this spring by the Administration, we find the trade-off in 
complexity unacceptable—particularly on behalf of smaller and medium­
sized businesses.
The intent of CCRS is, per the proposals, to provide neutral investment 
incentives. However, since their promulgation three months ago, studies 
have begun to appear questioning how neutral an incentive CCRS repre­
sents. We are not attempting to “take sides” with respect to the Administra­
tion’s or opposing views; however, it is our view that a depreciation system
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as complex as CCRS carries with it a burden to demonstrate it will accom­
plish the economic ends Congress expects in enacting it.
We believe the likely economic results of CCRS are far from clear. How­
ever, we also recognize congressional interest and the Administration’s in­
terest in revising the capital cost incentives originally enacted in the Eco­
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. In our judgment, the goals of scaling back 
capital cost allowances can be achieved with relative simplicity by making 
changes within the current ACRS provisions: lengthening recovery peri­
ods, allowing open-ended accounts, and repealing the investment tax credit 
(see below).
CCRS will be highly complex for the most sophisticated business. Imple­
mentation for the small or medium-sized enterprise will create substantial 
frustration. Its goals should be addressed in a more manageable fashion.
7.02—Repeal Investment Tax Credit
We agree with the proposed repeal of the investment tax credit (ITC). The 
ITC provisions are complex and the evidence is inconclusive whether the 
ITC is a significant incentive to spur investment or productivity. This reve­
nue-raising proposal is a necessary trade-off for other favorable tax reform 
measures, such as reduced marginal tax rates.
7.03—Revise Tax Treatment of Capital Gains
This proposal is extremely complex. Indexing basis for inflation, while aca­
demically appealing, is a complicated step and would result in uncertainty 
for taxpayers regarding the amount of gain or loss from year to year. De­
pending on the date chosen for computing the inflation figure, the final 
amount might not be known until after the transaction is completed.
Another complexity is the future election to index or to use a favorable 
capital gains rate. This election replaces the current one-step computation 
process with three steps—two computations plus a comparison. Further, 
the new definitions and distinctions between different kinds of assets do not 
lead to simplification of tax administration and preparation.
Other related items to be considered include the following:
1. Taxing the appreciation portion over cost of depreciable property as 
ordinary income would not be needed if indexation is not enacted.
2. The introduction of new distinctions among assets for capital gains 
purposes will produce litigation and much confusion—business vs. 
personal vs. investment.
3. The present section 1231 could be changed to provide consistent gain/
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loss treatment. This would permit the elimination of the complex, and 
unnecessary, rule requiring the five-year look back and subsequent 
recapture.
7.04—Index Inventories
This proposal would repeal the requirement, in effect since 1939, for con­
formity between tax and financial statement inventory methods where 
LIFO is used for tax purposes. As stated in the report, the requirement has 
hindered adoption of the LIFO method, even though this method better 
accounts for the effects of inflation than does FIFO. The conformity re­
quirement has also caused unnecessary uncertainty and complexity in ac­
counting for inventories.
We support the provision to repeal the LIFO conformity requirement.
The Administration also proposes an additional method, “Indexed 
FIFO,” for valuing inventories and calculating the cost of goods sold. Tax­
payers using either LIFO or FIFO could, as an alternative to their current 
inventory valuation method, elect to utilize such new Indexed FIFO 
method.
Under the new method, the inventory value of cost of goods sold, first 
determined under the FIFO method, would be adjusted annually using 
inflation factors based on a federal government price index (such as the 
Consumer Price Index). An additional deduction based on the percentage 
increase in the index applied to the beginning inventory (or ending in­
ventory if lower) would be permitted. This annual adjustment is intended 
to increase the taxpayer’s cost of goods sold up to their current value in 
inflationary periods, thereby lowering gross profits and adjusting taxable 
income to reflect only real economic gains. Inflationary gains would be 
removed from the tax base under such treatment.
The proposed Indexed FIFO method, which would only be available to 
offset inflation occurring in taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 
1987, could be adopted by taxpayers currently using either LIFO or FIFO. 
Adoption of the Indexed FIFO method, although a change in method of 
accounting, would not require prior consent of the IRS. However, it would 
require taxpayers currently using LIFO to recapture any LIFO reserves. 
The report tacitly recognizes that the increased tax liability resulting from 
such mandatory recapture would severely limit the attractiveness of the 
Indexed FIFO method for taxpayers currently using LIFO.
We support the Indexed FIFO concept as another means of adjusting for 
inflation as LIFO does. Indexed FIFO may be an acceptable alternative for 
the many smaller businesses that may not have adopted LIFO because of 
cost, complexity, and uncertainty. While we support the Indexed FIFO 
concept, we suggest certain modifications to the proposal.
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We believe that the annual index adjustment to cost of goods sold should 
be based entirely on beginning inventory and not on a reduced amount in 
those cases where ending inventory is lower, as proposed. A decline in 
ending inventory is irrevelant to the concept of calculating real economic 
gain. In order to state cost of goods sold at current costs so as to match 
current revenues, the indexed inflation adjustment should be based on 
opening inventory quantities (or cost of goods sold if lower).
We also support the concept of permitting adoption of the new Indexed 
FIFO method by taxpayers currently using either FIFO or LIFO. Tax­
payers currently using LIFO, however, should not be required to immedi­
ately recapture existing LIFO reserves when changing to Indexed FIFO. By 
mandating immediate recapture, the proposal effectively prohibits tax­
payers currently using LIFO from adopting Indexed FIFO, and thereby 
penalizes use of a currently permitted method that otherwise implements, 
to a large degree, the Administration’s stated goals and objectives. The 
proposal should permit taxpayers currently using LIFO to adopt the In­
dexed FIFO method with no recapture, so long as inventory quantities do 
not drop below that level existing as of the date of enactment. If inventory 
quantities should decline and cause a decrement, recapture should be re­
quired as under current LIFO law.
We further recommend that the mechanics and procedures for use of the 
Indexed FIFO method be closely analyzed to ensure simplicity. The cur­
rent LIFO regulations regarding the use of the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) and the Producer Price Indexes (PPI) present complex computa­
tional and conceptual problems that, in most cases, have made simplified 
LIFO impractical for most taxpayers for whom it was intended.
We support the proposal for Indexed FIFO with the modifications set 
forth above.
7.05—Retain $5,000 Limit on Expensing Depreciable 
Business Property
The limit on expensing of depreciable property is a desirable tax benefit 
conducive to both simplification and the growth of small business. Because 
of these considerations, the limitation should be increased to $10,000 as 
originally enacted.
7.07—Deny Rate Reduction Benefit Attributable to Ex­
cess Depreciation
The intent of this provision is to eliminate the perceived windfall that 
would result to a corporate taxpayer who sold an asset when the highest 
marginal rate was 33 percent, but benefited from depreciation deductions 
when the highest marginal benefit rate was 46 percent. It would require 
such taxpayers to restore to taxable income over three years 40 percent of 
the “excess” depreciation claimed for the period January 1, 1980, through 
June 30, 1986.
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The amount of the recapture tax on depreciable assets would be meas­
ured by the difference in tax rates multiplied by the cumulative difference 
between accelerated and economic depreciation between the time the asset 
was placed in service and June 30, 1986. This tax would be assessed once 
the asset passes its “crossover point.” In the case of real property, the 
crossover point would not be reached until several years beyond the years 
for which the proposal would subject the excess to taxation. Furthermore, 
in situations where taxpayers sell depreciable property prior to the 
crossover point at a gain and the gain is a capital gain, only a 2.5 percent 
rate reduction benefit would have occurred (20 percent maximum rate un­
der existing law less 17.5 percent rate under the Administration’s proposal). 
Yet, under the proposal, the 13 percent perceived windfall resulting from 
the change of tax rates would have to be paid within three years from the 
date of enactment of the proposal.
The proposal provides that, for purposes of the rate-reduction recapture 
rule, any excess depreciation would be reduced by any net operating losses 
carried forward by the taxpayer from a year before 1986 to a taxable year 
beginning after 1985. This proposal creates fictitious taxable income in 
order to solve what is really a rate problem. The effects of this fictitious 
income inclusion could be far-reaching, and the net operating loss car­
ryover provision addresses only one of the problems. In the context of the 
foreign tax credit limitation for example, it is clear that the fictitious income 
will distort the ratio. Furthermore, why shouldn’t the same provision apply 
to net operating loss carrybacks?
The analysis indicates that the proposal contains a number of simplifying 
assumptions. Earnings and profits depreciation is used as a proxy for eco­
nomic depreciation. It is indicated that this choice is made primarily for 
convenience, and that most of the taxpayers subject to the proposal would 
be corporations that are currently required to compute earnings and profits 
depreciation. In fact, corporations paying dividends that are clearly taxable 
do not currently bother to calculate earnings and profits. Their provision 
for deferred tax focuses on differences between financial statement de­
preciation and tax ACRS. This aspect will create a substantial admin­
istrative burden for taxpayers.
For these reasons, we oppose this proposal.
CHAPTER 8. MEASURE INCOME PROPERLY
8.01—Revise Accounting Rules for Production Costs
We support the concept of uniform capitalization rules. Uniformity has 
several advantages, including simplicity and fairness. However, we oppose 
uniform capitalization rules that result from identifying additional costs to 
capitalize merely for the purpose of raising additional revenue.
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Implementing the current proposal would be an endorsement of an in­
ventory costing procedure that is not currently in use by any taxpayer. Pres­
ently, inventory costing procedures for tax and financial statements are 
comparable. Tax differences usually arise from reserves and write-downs 
from such cost required for financial statement purposes (such as Thor type 
adjustments). However, the starting point currently is the cost of each in­
ventory item determined for both tax and financial statement purposes in 
substantially the identical manner. Implementation of the proposal may 
require the calculation of two costs for each inventory item prior to the 
determination of the need for additional adjustments to financial statement 
inventory costs.
This added complexity can only result in a lack of compliance by tax­
payers. It will take many years for the proposed rules to be clarified by 
regulations, understood by taxpayers, and implemented into existing cost 
accounting systems. We believe that this is an inappropriate result merely 
for the purpose of a one-time revenue gain.
The current full absorption inventory costing procedures have been in 
place since 1973. They are now fully understood and are being complied 
with by virtually all taxpayers. Congress should not legislate inventory cost 
accounting procedures and should permit the tax administrators to further 
develop and implement the concept of uniform inventory capitalization 
rules.
We oppose this proposal, although we support uniform capitalization 
rules.
8.02— Recognize Gain on Pledges of Installment 
Obligations
This proposal would cause recognition of all or a portion of the gain if an 
installment obligation is pledged as security for a loan.
In general, we support this concept and believe that appropriate excep­
tions have been provided for short-term business obligations. However, 
clarification is needed in the portion of the proposal which provides that 
gain on any subsequent collections of pledged obligations would be offset 
against the gain previously generated upon the pledge of the obligations.
8.03— Limit Use of Cash Method of Accounting
This proposal would make accrual accounting mandatory for the computa­
tion of taxable income where the taxpayer has average annual gross re­
ceipts of more than $5 million, or regularly uses a method other than the 
cash method to ascertain income, profit, or loss for financial statements, 
reports, and the like.
The proposal states that the cash method does not reflect economic in­
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come; is not in accordance with GAAP; is not justified for large taxpayers 
that already use the accrual method for financial accounting purposes; and 
that it produces a mismatching of income and deductions among taxpayers.
The Administration’s proposal implies that there should be a correlation 
between financial statement accounting and tax accounting. For that rea­
son, a brief discussion of the accounting principles underlying financial re­
porting and the relationship to the Internal Revenue Code may be helpful 
in improving the tax system.
Generally accepted accounting principles—or GAAP—are used to pre­
pare financial statements, and have been developed by the Financial Ac­
counting Standards Board and predecessor standard-setting bodies. The 
purpose of GAAP is to accurately reflect the financial condition of a busi­
ness at a particular point in time. For example, GAAP requires businesses 
to consistently use the accrual method of accounting, because it most accu­
rately “matches” revenues and expenses, and therefore most accurately re­
flects the financial condition of a business. Thus, businesses that prepare 
financial statements are required by GAAP to establish or increase re­
serves for losses that have not yet occurred.
On the other hand, the purposes of tax accounting are quite different. 
Tax accounting is a creature of legislative action, and for that reason tax 
accounting principles reflect economic and tax policy concerns different 
from GAAP. For example, current law recognizes that the ability to pay tax 
liabilities is important, and therefore allows certain taxpayers to use the 
cash method of accounting. For the same reason, it also allows dealers in 
personal property to report income from sales of such property as pay­
ments are received. Those accounting methods are not allowed under 
GAAP. Also, although GAAP requires that equipment be depreciated 
over its useful life, current law allows more generous write-offs to spur 
investment in depreciable property. In addition, to ameliorate the effects 
of the annual accounting period, the Internal Revenue Code allows the 
carryback or carryover of net operating losses. Such a concept is not con­
tained in GAAP, which adheres strictly to the annual accounting period 
concept.
In other words, tax accounting principles have reflected Congress’s con­
cern with various economic and tax policies that may not be relevant to the 
presentation of financial statements.
Instead of focusing on financial accounting principles, we believe tradi­
tional tax policy goals should be examined. For example, tax policy as it 
relates to individuals has reflected a proper concern for the ability to pay 
tax liabilities and has provided fairness among all taxpayers. However, the 
Administration’s proposal limiting the use of the cash method of accounting 
would ignore the traditional ability to pay concept.
In addition, in terms of fairness, the application of the proposal to cer­
tain entities (over $5 million in gross receipts) creates inequitable results
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and discriminates against taxpayers who perform services through large 
partnerships or professional corporations. Such individuals may perform 
similar services for similar compensation as a sole proprietor or as a part­
ner in a smaller partnership, yet they will be forced to use the accrual 
method, while their smaller counterpart will continue to use the cash 
method. The accrual method requirement thus hinges on the form of doing 
business; that is not good tax policy.
It is illogical—and again inconsistent and without sound legislative pur­
pose—to assume that the cash method would not clearly reflect income of a 
larger service organization but would clearly reflect income in the case of a 
smaller entity engaged in the identical business and operating in the identi­
cal fashion.
The proposal fails to appreciate the critical fact that the aggregate size of 
such businesses is immaterial and that the real taxpayers in personal service 
businesses are the individuals. (Regarding individuals, it should be noted 
that the generally accepted accounting principle to be applied for financial 
statement purposes for individuals is neither cash nor accrual; rather, it is 
to be based on a fair market value balance sheet determination. This high­
lights the misplaced notion that the Administration’s proposal would bring 
tax accounting and financial reporting in closer conformity for affected 
taxpayers.)
It should also be noted that changing to an accrual method would be 
difficult and expensive. Any individual who has been required to produce 
an accrual basis financial statement for credit purposes can attest to the 
difficulty. It would also add another potential area of controversy with the 
IRS—that is, judgment calls regarding when and how much income and 
expense should be accrued.
If the accrual method change is adopted, most partnership agreements 
would have to be renegotiated and revised. In addition to the significant 
time and expense of such an undertaking, the process would disrupt busi­
ness activity and complicate business relationships among partners.
Tax proposals often require a trade-off between simplicity and equity, 
but this proposal manages to work against both tax policy objectives. Un­
der the Administration’s proposal, income would be taxed to certain indi­
viduals before they receive it. The resulting cash flow problem could force 
them to borrow or sell assets to pay their taxes.
To summarize, evaluating the tax accounting proposals from the stand­
point of conformity with financial statement reporting principles is inap­
propriate because the goals of the two systems are different. And, different 
goals require the application of different principles.
For all of these reasons, we oppose this proposal as it relates to profes­
sional service businesses. The cash method has been recognized for sev­
enty-five years as a method that accurately reflects income. It is simple in 
application and fair in result. It should be retained.
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8.04—Repeal Reserve Method for Bad Debt 
Deductions
This proposal would repeal the reserve method of accounting for bad 
debts, thereby deferring the timing of a deduction for bad debts until ac­
counts receivable become wholly or partially worthless and, even then, 
only if the account was also charged off in whole or in part at that time.
There are three stated reasons for the proposed change. First, the re­
serve method results in a mismatching of income and expense because it 
accelerates a deduction to a period earlier than when the actual loss occurs. 
Second, the acceleration of the deduction raises questions about the time 
value of money. Third, the availability of the reserve method for bad debts 
encourages lenders to make risky loans.
The economic consequences of using the reserve method of accounting 
for bad debts would appear to be somewhat different for financial institu­
tions and other lenders, as opposed to the use of such a method in connec­
tion with trade receivables generated by manufacturers, wholesalers, re­
tailers, and service providers using accrual accounting. These trade 
receivables are generally collected well within a year and our comments 
will be restricted to such accounts.
Under Treasury Reg. 1.166-1(b), taxpayers are granted the right to elect 
the reserve method in the first year they are entitled to a bad debt deduc­
tion. Taxpayers who may have previously elected the specific charge-off 
method may routinely change to the reserve method under Rev. Proc. 85-8. 
Once the reserve method is established, the taxpayer may annually deduct 
a reasonable addition to the reserve, which shall be determined in light of 
the existing facts at the close of the taxable year. As a practical matter, 
taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service have relied on a formula devel­
oped in Black Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 300 (1940), to deter­
mine the reasonable addition to the bad debt reserve. The Black Motor Co. 
formula is a six-year moving average that utilizes the ratio of the actual 
accounts charged off during the six-year period to the accounts receivable 
outstanding at the end of each of the six years. Used for over forty years, 
this formula is utilized in Rev. Proc. 85-8 and was endorsed by the Supreme 
Court in Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 (1979).
Many taxpayers with short-term trade receivables, particularly those 
with a high volume of small dollar transactions, have developed very accu­
rate historical data showing the relationship of charge-offs to both sales and 
total outstanding accounts receivable. By using statistical techniques, these 
taxpayers can accurately determine the portion of any outstanding accounts 
receivable that will be written off in the future.
To the extent that a taxpayer can statistically demonstrate that a given 
percentage of its sales in a given year (to the extent uncollected at year- 
end) will never be collected, we believe that a mismatch occurs if the bad
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debt expense is not recorded in the year that the revenue from the sale was 
recorded. Even though the exact accounts to be written off in the future 
cannot be identified at the point of sale, income in the year of sale is still 
overstated if the sales are recorded at 100 percent because it can be demon­
strated that some of the sales will never be collected, even though the un­
collectible accounts cannot be specifically identified at that time.
The Administration’s concern about the time value of money seems par­
ticularly misplaced in the context of the Black Motor Co. formula, which, 
as stated earlier, generally results in a reserve equal to those accounts that 
will actually be written off within the next twelve months. If the account 
were not identified and charged off until four or five years in the future, the 
concern with time value might have some validity. However, to date, the 
time value of money concept, which figured prominently in the Deficit Re­
duction Act of 1984, has not focused on situations where the time span 
between accrual and economic performance, payment, identification of 
loss, and so on is for a period of only twelve months or less.
The Administration also argues that the reserve method discriminates in 
favor of firms with growing accounts receivable or worsening loss experi­
ence. Regarding the growth in receivables, unless the prior bad debt his­
tory is no longer relevant, it seems perfectly logical that a taxpayer with 
increasing accounts receivable would have a larger bad debt reserve than 
one with a smaller accounts receivable base. In the case of worsening loss 
experience, it also seems perfectly logical that such a taxpayer should have 
a larger reserve for bad debts than one with more favorable bad debt 
experience.
In this same context, it is agreed that the reserve method may treat tax­
payers differently, but the result would be no different under the specific 
proposed charge-off method. Under the specific charge-off method, a de­
duction could be taken in the year that the taxpayer determines the account 
to be worthless and actually writes it off. In the first place, this method 
would generate many more controversies between taxpayers and revenue 
agents than the relatively mechanical application of the Black Motor Co. 
formula. Secondly, taxpayers have widely divergent practices about how 
rapidly they proceed against delinquent accounts receivable and ultimately 
write them off. Given this widely divergent credit and collection practice, 
the specific charge-off method will result in vastly differing deductions for 
otherwise similarly situated taxpayers.
The last argument put forth by the Administration is that the use of the 
reserve method encourages lenders to make risky loans. No evidence exists 
to support this proposition. It is, however, well acknowledged in the busi­
ness world that a business with extremely tight credit policies would gener­
ally have a lower sales volume than a business with somewhat more relaxed 
credit policies. Obviously, a business with overly relaxed credit policies 
could have significantly expanded sales volume at the expense of very high
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accounts receivable, extensive collection costs, and high bad debt charge- 
offs. The goal of any successful business is to find the proper relationship 
between tight credit and expanded sales volume.
The Administration has not raised any arguments about administrative 
convenience or simplicity in the bad debt proposal. In fact, we believe that 
the specific charge-off method would be more complex and would generate 
more controversies between the IRS and taxpayers. The Administration 
also has not indicated that there is any present abuse in the reserve method 
of accounting for bad debts.
For the reasons stated, we oppose this proposal and urge the retention of 
the reserve method of accounting for bad debts.
8.05—Repeal Mining and Solid Waste Reclamation and 
Closing Cost Deduction
This proposal would eliminate the deduction currently allowed to accrual 
basis taxpayers for the estimated future reclamation or closing costs attrib­
utable to production or mining activities in the current year. The reason 
given for the proposed change is that economic performance will occur, and 
the related costs will be paid, in the future. Furthermore, it is noted that 
the current system is substantially more complicated than simply deducting 
the future expenses as they occur.
The proposed position is inconsistent with the concept that costs should 
be matched with related income in multi-period production operations. 
The reclamation and closing costs in some operations may amount to a 
significant part of the cost of production. If so, eliminating the effect of 
these costs from the calculation of the cost of the product could have a 
serious and adverse financial effect on the operation, which will not be 
solved by the ultimate allowable deduction and resulting net operating loss 
carryback. Instead of creating a setting in which economic decisions can be 
made against a “tax neutral” background, the focused mismatching of tax­
able receipts and deductions may well cause low margin but profitable oper­
ations to become economically unprofitable because of the tax 
consequences.
For these reasons, we oppose this proposal.
CHAPTER 9. REVISE TAXATION OF ENERGY  
AND NATURAL RESOURCES
9.02—Repeal Percentage Depletion
Since the establishment of the income tax in this country, percentage deple­
tion has been recognized as a method of capital recovery for the extractive
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industries. The capital of these industries is represented largely by mineral 
reserves that are discovered, developed, and produced. These reserves are 
discovered by exploration efforts rather than being created or constructed, 
as in the case of other types of assets. Such mineral reserves represent the 
product sold, not assets used to produce products to be sold. Thus, they are 
frequently called wasting assets.
From the beginning, at least a part of the income of the taxpayers pro­
ducing natural resources was recognized as the return of capital value exist­
ing on March 1, 1913. Accordingly, the Revenue Act of 1913 allowed 5 
percent of gross income as a depletion deduction. However, it was felt that 
the 5 percent deduction did not fully accomplish a return of the initial cap­
ital value, so Congress next allowed depletion based on the recovery of cost 
or the March 1, 1913, value.
This system not only created problems of valuation of existing proper­
ties, but also discriminated against newly discovered properties by limiting 
depletion to initial cost. Recognizing that cost has little relationship to the 
value of a mineral property, the Revenue Act of 1918 added the allowance 
of discovery depletion, based on the fair market value of properties at the 
date of discovery.
Although in theory the concept of discovery depletion allowed fair recov­
ery of capital based on value, it produced difficult questions of practicality. 
As a result, percentage depletion was substituted for discovery depletion 
for oil and gas wells in the Revenue Act of 1926, and for metal mines in 
1932. The percentages allotted to various minerals and metals were deter­
mined by compiling statistics of recorded discovery valuation cases com­
pared to production.
The history of percentage depletion is based, in part, on the desire for 
simplicity. To allow a method of capital recovery based on a percentage of 
gross income (where the percentage was in turn based on industry histo­
ries) is simpler than a depletion computation based on annual production 
and estimates of recoverable reserves.
In answer to the question of whether it is fair to provide for such recov­
ery of capital on a “favored” or “preferential” basis, it is suggested that this 
treatment is required in order to treat extractive industries comparably 
with other industries. All capital recovery has long been given a favored 
status in our tax system by allowing a deduction for cost and by the applica­
tion of capital gains tax rates. If capital recovery in non-extractive areas is 
accorded this favored status, then equally favorable taxation of capital re­
covery (using the older system of discovery depletion, or the more sim­
plified system of percentage depletion) is required to provide equity among 
the extractive industries and various other industries.
The proposal would permit continuation of percentage depletion of 
“stripper wells ” Since these wells constitute about 15 percent of domestic
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oil production and are produced typically on a very limited margin of prof­
itability, percentage depletion would be continued in the interest of na­
tional security and maintaining energy independence. The rationale behind 
allowing percentage depletion as a subsidy for stripper wells is strained by 
the fact that the 50 percent limitation acts to reduce or eliminate the deduc­
tion in the case of the wells for which it would be most needed; that is, the 
wells on which the profit level had declined to near or below zero. If it is 
desirable to subsidize such production, then a method should be utilized 
that would give increased support with decreased profits, and not vice 
versa.
For these reasons, we oppose this proposal.
9.03—Revise Minimum Tax on Intangible Drilling 
Costs
The proposal provides that 8 percent of all intangible drilling costs (IDCs) 
paid or incurred on successful wells in a taxable year would constitute a tax 
preference item. The amount of IDCs treated as preference items would 
not be reduced by net income from oil and gas properties as under present 
law. The amount of 8 percent is proposed as representing the difference 
between the present value of expensing and the present value of the deduc­
tions that would be allowed if the taxpayer capitalized the IDCs and de­
preciated them as CCRS class 3 property. It should be noted, however, that 
as the tax rate is reduced, the difference between the present value of ex­
pensing and capitalizing grows smaller, but the amount of IDCs treated as a 
preference item is not reduced accordingly. We support the proposal.
Additional Comments. The proposal would allow optional treatment to be 
continued, although the Treasury’s original proposal would have eliminated 
the deduction option. Because of the deduction’s controversial nature, it is 
presumed that the question of its elimination may be raised once more, and 
our comments are therefore included on this issue.
The option to deduct IDCs was first provided by T.D. 2447 in 1917. 
Although variations have been made in the rules as they were reissued in 
1919, 1943, 1956, 1960, 1965, and so on, IDCs have continued to be elec­
tively allowed as a deduction ever since.
The IDC incurred in the exploration and development of oil and gas 
wells has historically been allowed as an elective expense, even though it 
was capital in nature.
To achieve equity in taxation among industries, differences between in­
dustries must be fully understood and recognized.
In the case of a manufacturing plant, a building is typically constructed
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or purchased, and production machinery acquired and installed. Although 
the taxpayer may on occasion pay more or less than fair market value for 
the assets involved, a direct relationship usually exists between the cost and 
the value of the assets. Good accounting practices as well as tax law, require 
that such costs be capitalized and deducted ratably against the income 
earned from the future use of the property in the manufacturing process.
In the case of the extractive industries, however, drilling and develop­
ment costs do not represent either the purchase or the construction of a 
valuable asset. They represent instead either a complete loss (that is, dry 
hole) or the discovery of oil, gas, or other mineral reserves that have always 
existed but only now been found. There is no typical relationship between 
drilling costs and the value of reserves discovered. A well may discover 
reserves worth many times the drilling costs, or a well may be drilled at 
great cost that may discover no reserves at all. It is important to keep in 
mind this difference between the act of constructing or purchasing an asset 
and the act of discovering one.
Drilling costs are not like expenditures for the acquisition of assets such 
as buildings and machinery. They more nearly resemble research and de­
velopment expenditures. Both research and development, as well as drill­
ing costs, are undertaken with an expectation of profit, but with no assured 
magnitude of the value to be discovered. Either type of expenditure can, 
and sometimes will, result in great profit. Either type can, and frequently 
will, result in large economic loss. It should be noted that neither the Ad­
ministration’s proposal nor the original Treasury proposal recommend cap­
italization of research and development costs.
Since the value of buildings and machinery may be reasonably deter­
mined prior to acquisition, the cost of acquisition may be financed by 
pledging the assets to a lender. On the other hand, unproven oil and gas 
reserves (suspected deposits in areas not yet proven by drilling) are sel­
dom, if ever, allowed as collateral for a loan. While ideas to be researched 
or the possibility of finding unproven oil and gas reserves may attract inves­
tors with equity capital, neither will normally serve as collateral for debt 
financing.
9.04—Revise Royalty Taxation
The provisions establishing long-term capital gain treatment for timber, 
coal, and iron ore royalty income would be repealed under this proposal, 
along with the provisions for elective sale or exchange treatment for owners 
of timber or timber contracts. Problems of recovery of capital, the histor­
ical tax-favored status of capital recovery, and questions of fairness between 
industries are discussed in section 9.02 above and are not repeated here. 
We oppose this proposal.
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CHAPTER 10. REFORM TAXATION OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
10.01—Repeal Special Rules for Depository Institution 
Bad Debt Deductions
We support the modification of the special rules for depository institutions’ 
bad debt deductions. Since the percentage method for bad debt deductions 
for commercial banks will be phased out in 1987, its elimination would 
result in greater simplicity and fairness without causing undue harm to the 
industry. However, rather than outright repeal of the reserve method, fi­
nancial institutions should be allowed to use the experience method of 
computing the addition to the bad debt reserve.
10.02—Deny Deduction for Interest to Carry 
Tax-Exempt Bonds
This proposal does not result in a simplification of the current tax law. From 
an economic viewpoint, it is potentially harmful in these respects:
Since financial institutions are primary owners of tax-exempt bonds, this 
proposal would probably decrease the value of these bonds so severely that 
a number of marginal institutions would have problems meeting their reg­
ulatory capital requirements.
To eliminate the potentially harmful devaluation of existing tax-exempt 
portfolios, we recommend modification of the proposal to cover tax-ex­
empt securities issued on or after January 1, 1986, rather than securities 
purchased on or after January 1, 1986.
10.03—Repeal Tax Exemption for Large Credit Unions
Although this proposal would not result in simplification, it would never­
theless place large credit unions on par with other financial institutions. 
Therefore, we support the proposal.
10.04—Repeal Reorganization Rules for Financially 
Troubled Thrifts
For reasons of fairness and simplicity, we support the proposal to repeal the 
special reorganization rules for financially troubled thrifts. This will elimi­
nate the disparity in treatment between troubled thrifts and other finan­
cially troubled organizations.
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10.05—Repeal Special Rules for Net Operating Losses 
of Depository Institutions
Originally, the carryback rules for financial institutions were liberalized to 
allow them to take full tax advantage of the percentage method of adding to 
their bad debt reserves. Now that the percentage method, as a practical 
matter, has been phased out of existence, the current ten-year carryback of 
net operating losses is no longer needed. Further, over time there will be 
added simplicity, particularly where consolidated returns are concerned. 
For these reasons we support the proposal.
CHAPTER 12. MODIFY OTHER SPECIFIC 
SUBSIDIES
12.01—Repeal Tax Credit for Qualified Rehabilitation
Withdrawing the credit would accomplish the objective of a more neutral 
tax system, but would override the original objectives in enacting the 
credit.
We oppose this proposal.
CHAPTER 13. CURTAIL TAX SHELTERS
13.02—Extend At-Risk Limitation to Real Estate
This proposal would restrict the use of tax losses from limited-risk real 
estate transactions by individual taxpayers to offset current taxable income 
received from other sources. Curtailment of this tax shelter activity would 
result in greater equity and an improved perception of the income tax sys­
tem by the American public.
We support this proposal.
13.03—Revise Alternative Minimum Tax for 
Noncorporate Taxpayers
This proposal would revise the alternative minimum tax for noncorporate 
taxpayers. Although we agree with the policy objectives of an individual 
minimum tax, this particular proposal unnecessarily complicates the com­
putation of the preference items. The tightening of the alternative mini­
mum tax (AMT) under this proposal would also increase the number of 
taxpayers subject to AMT. Affected taxpayers would be required to apply 
two different sets of rules to the same items of income and expense. While
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some additional complexity for the sake of greater equity is acceptable, this 
proposal creates significant complexity, and the price is too great. Never­
theless, if an AMT is pursued, rules for broad uniform concepts should be 
developed.
We agree with the policy objectives of a minimum tax; however, we op­
pose this proposal.
13.04—Revise Corporate Minimum Tax
As stated in our comments on section 13.03, we support the concept of a 
minimum tax. However, we oppose this proposal, as the proposed revisions 
do not simplify the tax rules.
CHAPTER 14. REVISE TREATMENT OF 
RETIREMENT SAVINGS
14.01—Increase Spousal Individual Retirement Account 
Limits
The Administration proposes to increase the limit on Individual Retire­
ment Accounts (IRAs) for nonworking spouses to $2,000. The reason for 
the proposal is to encourage and broaden the use of IRAs to provide retire­
ment security. The inequities to families with a nonworking spouse are also 
cited as discriminatory and unfair.
We support this proposal. The elimination of the inequities to a non­
working spouse is cited as a desirable goal, and we agree in this case. Ineq­
uities sometimes exist in tax law and should remain so to accomplish other 
benefits that outweigh the disadvantage of inequity. However, more study 
should be given to the proposal’s impact on revenues. When IRAs were 
first made available to all working employees, regardless of coverage under 
employer qualified plans, revenue impact studies were grossly understated.
14.02—Unify Rules for Distribution from Tax-Favored 
Retirement Plans
The Administration proposes to reduce the complexity and inconsistency in 
distributions from qualified retirement plans by uniform treatment of dis­
tributions. Changes are also proposed to discourage early withdrawal and 
to extend withdrawal over the individual’s retirement years.
We agree that uniformity in distribution rules is a desirable goal. We 
endorse the elimination of disqualification as a sanction for violation of 
distribution rules by qualified employer plans. Both of these proposals will 
simplify the complicated rules of distributions.
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The special tax treatment given to certain qualified “lump-sum distribu­
tions” (LSDs) deserves considerable study before it is eliminated. One of 
the reasons for the enactment of special tax treatment for LSDs was to 
reduce the tax impact of “bunching of income” that had accrued over many 
years. Many individuals will continue to receive distributions in a single 
year because of circumstances beyond their control. By doing so, the dis­
tribution will be taxed at a much higher rate than if the distribution were 
received over several years. The elimination of this unfair bunching of in­
come is the very purpose of the special tax treatment.
The Administration should also consider the impact on revenues of the 
elimination of this special tax treatment. Revenues received with the spe­
cial treatment may actually be higher, when compared to the present value 
of future tax on distributions over a number of years at lower tax brackets. 
The benefits of easing the tax burden on LSDs outweigh the disadvantage 
of complexity and should be retained. The capital gain element is already 
being gradually eliminated since only distributions attributable to contribu­
tions before 1974 qualify for capital gain tax treatment.
When the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 
was enacted, capital gain taxation was eliminated for all years after 1973, a 
date selected to prevent retroactive elimination of capital gain treatment. 
The Administration now proposes to ignore ERISA in its elimination of 
capital gains taxation, a clear conflict with the original policy of grand­
fathering contributions prior to 1974.
A minimum distribution penalty of 50 percent of the difference between 
the required minimum distribution and the amount actually distributed 
would be imposed on the recipient with a right, in some cases, to recover 
the penalty from the plan. A minimum distribution is based on the life 
expectancy of the participant or beneficiary. Although the proposal would 
simplify life expectancy calculations by using standard five-year ranges to 
determine the minimum distribution, in many cases complicated actuarial 
computations may still be required with regard to recapture tax on early 
distributions. Tax simplification will not be achieved if the recipient is sub­
ject to such a penalty. Since the computations must be made at the plan 
level, if indeed such a penalty is necessary, it should be imposed on the plan 
administrator. Possibly, the administrator should have the right to recover 
from the recipient if the latter has submitted incorrect information about 
age, etc. Furthermore, a 50 percent nondeductible penalty on the under­
distribution is extremely harsh and is comparable to the existing fraud 
penalty. Also, any penalty should be abated if due to reasonable cause.
The Administration proposes to change the basis recovery rules in con­
nection with plan distributions. Distributions prior to the so-called annuity 
starting date would be treated first as income, rather than recovery of em­
ployee nondeductible contributions. There would be a transitional rule so 
that pre-January 1, 1986, employee contributions would be recovered first,
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then distributions would be income and, finally, they would consist of 
post-1985 employee contributions. This proposal adds more complexity 
rather than simplicity.
Since nondeductible employee contributions are restricted with regards 
to amount and also affect maximum annual additions to a defined contribu­
tion plan, their one advantage—that they are recovered tax-free before any 
income is triggered—should be retained. The overall desire to increase 
savings to improve our economy would best be served if the current recov­
ery rule with respect to voluntary contributions is continued. Furthermore, 
it is simpler to deal with recoveries before income, and it avoids a tremen­
dous amount of recordkeeping.
To avoid this harsh result, a participant with a substantial amount of 
voluntary contributions to a plan could opt for a lump-sum distribution. He 
or she would then rollover the amount in excess of the cost basis into an. 
IRA. Effectively, the entire cost would be recovered tax-free and the IRA 
distributions need not start until age seventy and one-half.
Another proposal is the elimination of the three-year annuity rule. This 
rule has worked well for many years. Most qualified plan distributions in­
clude relatively small contributions by the employee-participants, as com­
pared to the cost element of a commercial annuity. Recovering the em­
ployee’s contributions over a period of up to three years is a very simple 
way to account for the taxation of the benefits. After recovery, all distribu­
tions are fully taxable to the participant and his or her beneficiaries. Fur­
thermore, delaying taxation of benefits in the years immediately following 
retirement can have a very beneficial effect since there is such a tremen­
dous change in the employee’s economic status.
A further proposal is to change the annuity rule, whereby the partici­
pant’s cost (that is, voluntary contributions) will be recovered over his or 
her life expectancy. Upon the participant’s death, any unrecovered cost will 
be deducted by the beneficiaries. If the participant outlives his life expec­
tancy, the cost recovery will cease and future distributions will be fully 
taxable. This is unbelievably complex and will require tremendous rec­
ordkeeping. In most cases, the cost basis to the participant will be insignifi­
cant in relationship to the amount of paperwork involved. For these rea­
sons, we oppose this aspect of the proposed changes in the annuity rules.
14.03—Modify Deduction Rules for Tax-Favored 
Retirement Plans
The Administration proposes to replace the present 15 percent of aggregate 
compensation limit for profit-sharing plans, with a requirement that contri­
butions for any individual cannot exceed 15 percent of such individual’s 
compensation for the year. The carryover of unused contribution limits of 
25 percent of aggregate compensation would be eliminated unless the plan
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is a “retirement type” plan. The present combined limit on contributions to 
profit-sharing plans and pension plans of 25 percent would be extended to a 
combination defined contribution pension plan and defined benefit pension 
plan. Excess contributions would no longer trigger disqualification, but 
would be subject to a 10 percent tax annually as long as the excess contribu­
tion remained in the plan and was nondeductible. Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans (ESOPs) would be placed in parity with other qualified 
plans eliminating the special tax treatment of ESOPs.
Small employers select profit-sharing plans because of the flexibility they 
afford in contributions. If the employer’s earnings are volatile, a discretion­
ary profit-sharing plan allows him to have a retirement plan without fear of 
incurring ill-timed required contributions. The credit carryovers also allow 
the employer to make up contributions to employees for years that no con­
tributions or less than the allowable contributions were made. In this way, 
the small employer or the employer in an industry with volatile earnings 
can provide its employees with a retirement plan. Elimination of the in­
creased limit carryover will only diminish the ability of the employer to 
provide reasonable contributions to employee retirement plans. This pro­
posal provides little, if any, simplification of the tax code. Small employers 
generally fall into the top-heavy category under which the proposal would 
prohibit carryover provisions for such plans.
The reason for the larger contribution limitations on combined defined 
contribution pension plans and defined benefit plans under present law is 
that minimum-funding standards require contributions to a defined contri­
bution pension plan regardless of the deductibility. If combination defined 
contribution pension plan deduction limits are to be imposed (in the same 
amounts as combination profit-sharing deduction limits), then minimum­
funding rules should be changed to require contributions only to the extent 
of deductible amounts. This will prevent plan sponsors from having to 
make contributions to a money purchase pension plan for which no deduc­
tion is allowable. Further consideration is warranted in light of the mini­
mum-funding standards imposed by ERISA. ERISA attempted to assure 
employees that funds would be set aside as promised by employers and 
therefore imposed minimum-funding standards. We again encourage fur­
ther study into the reasons for the existing law before major departures are 
made.
A serious problem with the complexity of tax law is the constant chang­
ing of certain provisions. A case in point is the proposal to eliminate all 
special provisions relating to ESOPs and thus place them in parity with 
other qualified plans. In the Tax Reform Act of 1984 (TRA ’84), enacted in 
July 1984, certain changes were made to ESOP rules to encourage expan­
sion of ESOP use. Just a year ago ESOPs were viewed as good for the 
economy and employee ownership was encouraged. Now, it seems that all 
of that reasoning was incorrect and all the provisions encouraging ESOPs
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should be taken out of the law. This contradiction indicates a need to give 
proper consideration and study to ESOP tax law changes before they are 
enacted. Certainly, a consideration of reasons for TRA ’84 ESOP provi­
sions is warranted.
We oppose this proposal. We feel that a better approach to simplification 
of qualified retirement plan law is to take the necessary time to study all 
provisions relating to this area. Various limitation provisions should be co­
ordinated in a cohesive manner, giving due consideration to combining lim­
itations into a single acceptable set of rules. Simplification of qualified plan 
rules is desirable and attainable, if proper study and deliberation are given. 
We would welcome the opportunity to work with various interested parties 
on such a project and assist in the simplification effort.
14.04—Modifying Annual Limits on Contributions and 
Benefits Under Tax-Favored Plans
This proposal may be summarized as taking two general approaches. First, 
it intimates that smaller employers are suspect and larger employers are 
not; the same attitude found in the top-heavy rules. Second, it presumes 
fairness and simplicity can be achieved by shifting the monitoring of max­
imum annual additions and benefits to qualified plans from the plan admin­
istrator to the retired participant.
Elimination of the annual addition and benefit limit for a participant in 
both a defined contribution and a defined benefit plan, except top-heavy 
plans, is discriminatory in applying the law. The principal reason given for 
the change is the complexity of determining the limitations. Clearly, a 
larger non-top-heavy plan would more likely have the professional help to 
accomplish this than the smaller top-heavy plan.
By instituting a 10 percent penalty tax for annual benefit distributions 
received by a participant or beneficiary in excess of 125 percent of the 
defined benefit annual limit (currently $90,000 x 125 percent = $112,500), 
more complexity rather than less would result. The stated purpose for this 
change (other than reducing complexity at the plan administrator level 
where it could more easily be handled) is to penalize those individuals who 
were able to benefit from plans of more than one employer. It is doubtful 
that the number of individuals with duplicate coverage necessitates this 
change; the cure may be worse than the disease.
The 10 percent penalty tax would actually penalize participants of de­
fined contribution plans for achieving good investment results. In fact, not 
even a very great investment return may be necessary to have a participant/ 
beneficiary fall into this penalty situation. For example, if a participant 
received annual additions to a defined contribution plan of $25,000 for 
twenty years and the plan had an average investment yield of only 8 per­
cent, the participant’s account would reach approximately $1,144,000 at the
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end of the twenty-year period. Equal payments over the succeeding twenty 
years with a yield of 8 percent, would produce annual distributions of about 
$116,500 and a 10 percent penalty on $4,000. If the same participant also 
had contributed to an IRA, all of the benefits from the IRA would be 
penalized at 10 percent.
We oppose this proposal.
14.05—Apply 10 Percent Recapture Tax to Qualified 
Retirement Plan Assets Reverting to Employer
The Administration proposes to impose an additional tax of 10 percent of 
qualified retirement plan funds reverting to the employer upon plan 
termination.
We agree in principle that such abuses as those described in the proposal 
should be effectively controlled. However, many plan terminations are 
made as a matter of last resort when the employer is experiencing financial 
difficulty. If the plan has been overfunded and no intended abuse is pres­
ent, the employer should not be penalized. We believe other restrictions 
can be applied to prevent abuses by reducing overfunding inherent in cer­
tain actuarial assumptions, and by limiting the penalty to abuse cases. We 
support this proposal if modifications are added to exclude cases where 
abuse is not intentional.
14.06—Revise Cash or Deferred Arrangement (Section 
401(k)) and Employer Matching Contribution 
Rules
The Administration’s proposal would make substantial changes to cash or 
deferred arrangements (CODAs), adding several new restrictions, limits, 
and requirements. Among the many changes is a new limit of $8,000 max­
imum deferral per participant, reductions to the limit for IRA contribu­
tions, establishment of separate limits for plans meeting special re­
strictions, and new rules relating to employer matching contributions.
The $8,000 maximum deferral limit is imposed in addition to the preex­
isting section 415 limitation of $30,000 for qualified plans. This second limit 
is unduly restrictive and will result in employers establishing additional or 
alternative retirement plans to avoid the limit, creating unnecessary costs 
and administrative burdens. The further reduction in the limit for IRA 
contributions also is objectionable for similar reasons.
The provision to disqualify a CODA when excess contributions are not 
distributed by the end of the year, following the year in which the excess 
occurred, is unduly harsh. When the excess is not discovered in time to
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make the correction, a disqualification will harm all participants in the 
plan. A penalty would be more appropriate.
We oppose this proposal.
14.07—Modify Rules for Benefit Forfeitures
Under the proposal, qualified pension plans would be permitted to use 
forfeitures of benefits to increase benefits for other employees covered un­
der the plan. Uniform treatment for all qualified plans is desired and the 
proposal would benefit rank-and-file employees.
We agree with the proposal because it will simplify the administration of 
pension plans.
CHAPTER 15. REFORM INTERNATIONAL 
TAXATION
Introduction
The main consequence of proposals affecting the international area is to 
increase the U.S. tax burden on international operations of U.S. multina­
tional corporations, relative to the tax burden on domestic operations. The 
proposals anticipate an increase in domestic production because of reduced 
tax benefits from operating abroad. The proposals do not consider whether 
the anticipated increase in domestic production and consequent increases 
in tax collections may not materialize because nontax factors will make it 
preferable to operate abroad or because the business would be taken over 
by foreign competition whose tax burden is less than that of the U.S. 
multinational.
15.01—Reform Foreign Tax Credit
Under this proposal, the credit for taxes imposed by any foreign country 
would be limited to the U.S. tax on income from that country. Losses in a 
given foreign country would be prorated between U.S. source income and 
income from sources in other countries, and subsequent profits in the loss 
country would be allocated to taxable income elsewhere in the same man­
ner as the losses were allocated (Recoupment Principle). To preserve the 
integrity of the per-country limitation, dividends and subpart F income 
from foreign subsidiaries earning income in more than one foreign country 
would be resourced to the countries in which the income was earned in 
proportion to the subsidiary’s after-tax income (including dividends from 
each country). Where the country of incorporation taxes income from
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sources in other countries, an election can be made to consider a portion of 
the home country’s taxes as taxes imposed by the country in which the 
income is earned. A separate tracing and allocation of income sources 
would be required for separate limitation investment income. We also un­
derstand that the tracing and allocation rules would apply to fourth and 
lower tier subsidiaries, even though no foreign tax credit is allowed for 
lower than third-tier taxes.
This proposal is primarily based on the premise that the overall limita­
tion diverts investment from the United States to other countries with 
lower tax rates. This premise would be true if investment decisions by the 
business sector were based primarily on comparative tax rates. In fact, in­
vestment decisions in the business world are a product of multiple factors. 
In addition to taxes, a business would consider labor costs, availability of 
raw materials and components, access to markets (including customs duties 
and import quotas), import and export restrictions generally, local nontax 
investment incentives such as availability of low-cost local financing, and 
general economic and political stability.
Two of the major objectives for repealing the per-country limitation in 
1976 (at the time the limitation was the greater of the per-country or overall 
limitation) were to prevent the allowance of foreign tax credits where losses 
in some countries reduced or eliminated overall foreign source income, and 
simplification of the foreign tax credit calculation.
The first objective would be retained to the extent losses in a foreign 
country are allocated to taxable income in other foreign countries. The 
Recoupment Principle for subsequent profits in loss countries may or may 
not be beneficial, depending upon the availability of tax loss carryover in 
foreign countries, and the generation of subsequent profits in loss coun­
tries. This proposal raises a question of equity and fairness by giving tax­
payers the worst result where the detriment from allocation of losses is not 
offset by application of the Recoupment Principle.
The second objective would be lost. Taxpayers would have to calculate a 
separate foreign tax credit limitation for each country in which their in­
come is sourced. Regarding dividends from foreign subsidiaries, tracing 
could go through multiple tiers of corporations, and it would be necessary 
to calculate the effect of resourcing foreign taxes to determine whether the 
elective resourcing treatment is advantageous. Elaborate bookkeeping, 
particularly with respect to application of the Recoupment Principle, will 
unnecessarily complicate an already complex area of the code.
Given restrictions on allowance of the foreign tax credit enacted in 1976, 
adoption of Regs. §1.861-8 for allocating and apportioning deductions in 
1977, and rules enacted in 1984 to provide for the tracing of U.S. source 
and separate limitation interest income, we question whether the addi­
tional revenue that may result from enactment of the proposal would be
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worth the additional time and effort that would be required on the part of 
taxpayers and the IRS to administer the proposed revisions.
In the event the per-country limitation is adopted, we recommend the 
following modifications be adopted:
1. The credit should be determined on a strict per-country basis and the 
proposals for allocation of losses and the Recoupment Principle 
should be dropped. Any marginal increase in fairness resulting from 
allocating losses under the proposal will be more than offset by the 
increased complexity resulting from necessity for accurate records in 
tracing losses for subsequent application of the Recoupment 
Principle.
2. The proposal would require sourcing of separate limitation invest­
ment income on a per-country basis. Given the new restrictions on the 
foreign tax credit limitation for investment income contained in the 
1984 Tax Act, the expansion of the definition of separate limitation 
investment income in the proposal, and the fact that it is usually quite 
easy to avoid any taxes on portfolio investment income, any require­
ments for determining the foreign tax credit limitation for such in­
come on a per-country basis should be eliminated.
15.02—Modify Sourcing Rules for Income and 
Deductions
Carryforward and Election Rules
Under the proposal, the existing two-year carryback of excess foreign tax 
credits would be retained and the carryforward period for excess credit 
would be extended from five to ten years. Taxpayers would be permitted to 
credit or deduct foreign taxes on a per-country basis instead of the present 
all-or-nothing election.
We endorse these proposals, subject to the following recommendations, 
which would increase fairness in application of the foreign tax credit:
1. In the interest of consistency, the carryover period should be three 
years back and fifteen years forward as in the case of other business 
credits.
2. Taxpayers should be allowed to deduct all excess foreign tax credits. 
This is critical for U.S. contractors and other service providers who 
are subject to foreign taxes on work performed in the United States 
and for customers and clients located in foreign countries that base 
their taxes on the place where the benefit of the services is received
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rather than where the work is performed, which is the U.S. rule. 
Implementation of this recommendation would preserve or increase 
employment in the United States.
Research and Development Expenses
The current moratorium on apportionment of U.S. research and develop­
ment (R&D) expenses to foreign source income for purposes of the foreign 
tax credit limitation is due to expire after 1985. Although the proposal 
recommends extending the R&D credit (which is also due to expire after 
1985) for three more years, there is no mention of whether the R&D mor­
atorium for foreign tax credits will be continued.
Apportionment of R&D expenses to foreign source income has been 
justified on the basis that R&D generally contributes to the profitability of 
foreign operations. However, to the extent apportioned R&D generates 
excess foreign tax credits, the result is the same as though there was no 
deduction for R&D and the credit was allowed. Since R&D is usually a 
more discretionary expenditure than foreign taxes, the effect is to provide a 
disincentive for R&D expenditures for corporations with excess foreign tax 
credits.
We recommend that the moratorium be made permanent, or at least 
extended for whatever additional period the R&D credit is extended.
Sourcing of Royalties
This provision would maintain the existing rule that royalties from related 
foreign licensees will continue to generate foreign source income and pro­
poses to maintain the generally accepted rule that sales of intangibles for 
use abroad generate foreign source income.
Unlike passive investment income such as portfolio interest and divi­
dends, intangible property licenses are usually motivated by nontax consid­
erations and are usually much closer to ordinary business operations.
For the same reasons that support the provisions for sourcing royalties 
from related persons, we recommend that royalties from unrelated li­
censes, for use of intangibles abroad, should continue to generate foreign 
source income.
Sourcing of Income
Property Sales. This provision would replace the present title passage test, 
for determining the source of sales income, with sourcing the income in the 
seller’s country of residence unless a fixed place of business in another 
country materially participates in the sale. In the latter case, the income 
would be sourced in that country. In the case of goods manufactured in one 
country and sold in another, the income would be sourced in the country in
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which the goods are manufactured unless the manufacturer has a fixed 
place of business for selling the goods in another country, in which case 50 
percent of the income would be considered to be sourced in each country as 
under present regulations.
Contrary to an implicit objective of the international proposals to en­
courage employment in the United States, this proposal would have the 
effect of discouraging exports by increasing U.S. taxes on exports in many 
situations, thereby reducing chances of successful competition with foreign 
suppliers. An additional response to changing the source rules could be to 
move U.S. manufacturing operations abroad so that the entire profit would 
generate foreign source income.
In addition, basing the sourcing rules on a subjective test like the pre­
dominant location of selling activities, rather than on an objective test such 
as the place title passes will increase uncertainty and disputes in the already 
murky international tax area.
80/20 Corporation Rules for Interest and Dividends. This provision would 
treat dividends and interest paid by U.S. corporations that normally derive 
at least 80 percent of their gross income from foreign sources as U.S. 
source rather than foreign source income, as under present law. The pro­
posal does not identify any particular problem with the current rule except 
for semantic restructuring that would classify interest income, which is not 
subject to withholding under current law because it is considered to be 
from foreign sources (for example, bank account interest), as simply ex­
empt from withholding. This takes a diametrically opposite approach from 
the proposal concerning the per-country limitation for the foreign tax 
credit. This proposal would look solely to the country of incorporation 
rather than the sources of income to determine sources of interest and 
dividends paid by the corporation.
The chief impact of the proposal would appear to be on foreign persons’ 
wishing to invest in countries where the home country does not have a tax 
treaty with the third country, but the United States does have a treaty with 
that country. It would appear to be better to deal with this problem through 
the antitreaty Model Treaty. For U.S. shareholders, the chief impact re­
lates to expense allocations for foreign tax credits. With enactment of re­
quirements for tracing investment interest in 1984, the only significant ben­
efit that remains appears to be where a U.S. shareholder prefers to conduct 
foreign operations through a branch of a U.S. corporation rather than 
through a foreign corporation. As a matter of fact, it appears that U.S. 
shareholders could reap significant benefits in some situations under the 
proposal where expenses and losses with respect to assets yielding foreign 
source income are required to be allocated and apportioned to foreign 
source income in computing the foreign tax credit limitation.
Since the chief remaining value of the 80/20 exception is to facilitate
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investments abroad by U.S. and foreign investors through U.S. rather than 
foreign corporations, we recommend retention of the existing 80/20 rules 
to reduce tax distinctions based on matters of form (U.S. vs. foreign corpo­
rations) rather than on substance.
Allocation of Interest Expense. The proposal would require allocation of 
interest deductions between U.S. and foreign source income on the basis of 
consolidated group income from U.S. and foreign sources, rather than on a 
separate company basis as at present. It would no longer be possible to 
avoid allocating interest expense to foreign source income by separating 
interest from group members with foreign source income.
This proposal deals with a larger problem concerning the logic and fair­
ness of the rules for apportioning interest expense generally. One of the 
major difficulties with existing regulations is the assumption that interest is 
fungible except in certain narrow situations. This is contrary to the facts in 
many cases. Enactment of this provision should be delayed pending a study 
to formulate legislative or regulatory proposals that would deal with the 
tracing vs. fungibility issues on a more equitable basis than the present 
regulations.
Depreciation of Foreign Assets
This provision would require use of the more conservative RCRS rules of 
the Treasury tax reform plan in depreciating assets of foreign branches and 
subsidiaries.
This follows the existing practice of allowing less liberal depreciation 
benefits for assets used abroad, and can result in additional complexity 
beyond domestic book/tax differences because foreign tax authorities may 
require depreciation based on a third set of rules. It is frequently difficult to 
ensure that foreign accounting personnel can account for depreciation on a 
U.S. tax basis.
In the absence of a clear purpose to discourage investment abroad in 
depreciable assets, foreign assets should be depreciable on a book basis. If 
this is deemed to be too liberal a rule, then the assets should be depreciated 
on whatever basis is permissible for domestic assets.
15.04—Revise Taxation of Foreign Exchange Gains and 
Losses
The proposals would resolve many unclear issues and codify certain rules 
developed through case law and IRS rulings, based on a 1980 Treasury 
study, which generally conforms with the foreign exchange rules of FASB 
Statement No. 52. We support the approach of the proposal, with the fol­
lowing comments:
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Foreign Branches. Foreign currency books of foreign branches will be 
translated only under the profit and loss method. This generally follows 
FASB Statement No. 52, except that FASB takes account of unrealized 
exchange gains and losses for inflationary currencies. Taxpayers should be 
allowed to take account of unrealized exchange gains and losses where this 
is required by FASB Statement No. 52.
Foreign Currency Denominated Items Where U.S. Dollars Are Functional 
Currency. The proposal would reconcile the differences between dollar and 
foreign currency interest rates by requiring amortization of the differential 
on certain financial assets and liabilities such as trade receivables and paya­
bles, debt instruments, and preferred stock. We recognize the theoretical 
equity of this approach. However, to avoid unnecessary complexity where 
the actual differentials are small, we recommend that the amortization 
rules should apply only where the transaction exceeds a minimum dollar 
amount.
Foreign Currency Forward Contracts. Gain or loss on forward contracts 
hedging the principal amount of business-related foreign currency assets 
and liabilities would be treated as adjustments to interest income or ex­
pense on an accrual or mark-to-market basis. We support this approach 
and recommend that it be extended to forward contracts that hedge the net 
asset or net liability position of foreign subsidiaries, to be consistent with 
the rules for hedging net asset positions of foreign branches whose books 
are maintained in foreign currency.
Foreign Tax Credit
Regular Dividends From Foreign Subsidiaries. There should be consistent 
application of the rules for translating foreign currency in calculating the 
amount of a distribution treated as a dividend, and all terms in the deemed 
paid foreign tax credit formula:
Deemed Paid Foreign Tax = Foreign Tax x Dividend
Accumulated 
Earnings and 
Profits
Since dividends from foreign subsidiaries frequently represent accumu­
lated earnings and profits for several years, we endorse the proposed reten­
tion of the Bon Ami approach, under which the deemed-paid tax formula is 
translated at the date of the dividend. This rule should also apply in com­
puting the amount of a distribution treated as a dividend. It is even more 
appropriate than a year-by-year translation given the new pooling approach 
for aggregating all earnings in calculating the deemed-paid credit.
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Subpart F Income (Including Investment in U.S. Property). We support 
using the average rate of exchange for the year in translating foreign taxes 
in the subpart F deemed-paid credit calculation. This is consistent with the 
new rules for eliminating unrealized exchange gains and losses in calculat­
ing subpart F income and, unlike conventional dividends from foreign non­
subpart F subsidiaries, is based on a concept of current distribution of 
earnings.
Section 1248. Under current law, the amount of gain treated as a dividend 
on the sale or liquidation of a foreign subsidiary takes unrealized gains and 
losses into account under subpart F principles. The numerator and de­
nominator of the deemed-paid credit calculation are translated on the same 
basis; however, translation of foreign taxes is unclear. Since previously 
taxed subpart F income is excluded from treatment as a dividend under 
section 1248, the remaining earnings should be treated as a conventional 
dividend if actually distributed before the sale or liquidation which triggers 
section 1248. Consistent with the principles applicable to translating reg­
ular dividends and related deemed-paid foreign taxes, we recommend that 
earnings and foreign taxes should be translated at the date of a transaction 
that triggers application of section 1248.
15.05—Reform the Mirror System of Taxation for the 
U.S. Possessions
The proposal would repeal the present 100 percent credit and dividend 
received deduction for qualified business and investment income from 
Puerto Rico and other U.S. possessions (the comparable benefit for corpo­
rations engaged in business in the Virgin Islands would also be eliminated). 
The proposals would replace the income based credit with a new wage 
based credit that will increase the U.S. tax on possessions operations in 
most instances and eliminate any benefits for possessions source invest­
ment income. A grandfather clause would preserve the present income 
based credit for existing products for five years if the wage credit is not 
elected.
The proposal overemphasizes the absolute dollar value of the tax benefit 
accruing to certain large companies and does not adequately take into ac­
count the interests and concerns of the broader section 936 community. 
Puerto Rico has made significant gains in terms of economic growth and 
the development of its infrastructure. This was accomplished only through 
the maintenance of a strong tax incentive program. It is premature to con­
sider any further cutback in the section 936 incentive program.
We are concerned that any significant tampering with section 936 will 
have serious adverse consequences for the Puerto Rican economy and its 
people. The proposal does not address the issue of the increased transfer
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payments to Puerto Rico that would become necessary in light of a signifi­
cant increase in unemployment.
Much of the impetus for repeal of the possessions credit has resulted 
from Treasury Department studies that indicate that tax savings per worker 
have been far in excess of wage costs per worker. To some extent there may 
be questions concerning the methodology of these studies. The studies ap­
pear to include foreign taxes on actual investment in determining the tax 
savings per worker and do not take into account indirect benefits to the 
Puerto Rican economy resulting from employment in businesses which re­
ceive the direct benefits of the credit. Further, the proposal does not quan­
tify possible loss of tax revenue which is bound to occur as mainland com­
panies consider other low-tax locations.
Most studies involving section 936 are based on empirical data relating to 
years prior to adoption of the section 936(h) provisions, which require al­
location of income to manufactured intangibles. Although the proposal in­
dicates that, based on preliminary analysis of 1983 returns, there has been 
no reduction in tax benefits per worker as compared to prior years, it is 
highly unlikely given the short history of section 936(h) that adequate time 
has elapsed to accurately support such a conclusion.
Any moves to repeal the possessions credit should be delayed until ade­
quate statistics can be developed regarding the impact of the new (post- 
TEFRA) rules for intangible income. In any case, proposals for repeal 
should be postponed pending completion of studies that adequately estab­
lish the extent to which anticipated increases in tax revenues will be offset 
by increased costs of providing economic assistance to Puerto Rico.
The five-year grandfather clause for the existing credit is insufficient. 
Investment and business decisions with respect to existing products have 
been made on the premise that the credit would be indefinite. Even after 
the actual cost of investment has been recovered, there would be additional 
costs and burdens associated with relocating existing operations to the ex­
tent repeal of the credit would achieve the intended effect of moving Puerto 
Rican operations to the U.S. mainland or elsewhere. Therefore, the grand­
father clause should be made permanent regarding existing products, with 
appropriate limitations to prevent the introduction of new products under 
the blanket of existing products.
Rather than have the wage credit be mutually exclusive of the grand­
father clause on a per-corporation basis, taxpayers should be allowed to 
elect the wage credit for grandfathered products on a product-by-product 
basis.
Where the wage credit is elected, there should be a foreign tax credit for 
any possessions taxes. The wage credit is an intended benefit, while the 
foreign tax credit is a generally available benefit without regard to any 
possessions incentives.
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